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1 Introduction 
1.1 Indigenous peoples and human rights in Latin America 
Over 500 years after the conquest of Latin America begun, the continent’s indigenous 
peoples still exist under conditions of extreme disadvantage compared to the dominant 
society around them.1 Dispossession, discrimination and suppression of their customs, 
practices and institutions have undermined their cultural, social and economic integrity 
and their prospects for facing the challenges of a changing world. Among the most 
serious threats to indigenous peoples in Latin America today is the rapid escalation of 
natural resource extraction, as a globalized economy has made the countries in the 
region increasingly dependent on resources like timber, minerals and oil. Growing 
realization of the enormous biodiversity of the tropical rainforests and its potential for 
economic gain contributes to attracting international investment to heavily indebted 
countries. Indigenous peoples’ territories are often rich in such resources, mainly 
because the economic practices of their inhabitants are well adjusted to the fragile 
nature of the environment.2 Thus comes the “second conquest”; the scramble of 
governments and transnational corporations for natural resources on indigenous 
peoples’ lands.3  
This development has been accompanied by its opposite; the rise of indigenous 
movements all over Latin America in protest against neo-liberalism and its detrimental 
effects on their communities. Gaining in strength and organizational capacity during the 
past decades, indigenous movements have become a social and political force to be 
reckoned with in many Latin American countries. Internationally, indigenous peoples’ 
organizations have pressured to put their situation on the agenda of inter-governmental 
institutions, and their demands to achieve recognition of their cultural integrity and right 
to self-determination are being met with increasing acceptance.  
 
1  Anaya (2004) p. 4 
2  The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) in its Principle 22 states that: 
“Indigenous people and their communities (…), have a vital role in environmental management and 
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices.” 
3  Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) p. 245 
  3 
                                                
The ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Convention no. 169 of 1989, is 
to date the most comprehensive legally binding treaty on the rights of indigenous 
peoples. The Convention includes provisions on cultural integrity, land and resource 
rights and non-discrimination, and instructs states to consult indigenous peoples in all 
decisions affecting them.4 It contains the following definition of indigenous peoples:  
Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.5  
Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a 
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions 
of this Convention apply.6  
ILO Convention no. 169 has been ratified by seventeen states, thirteen of which are 
Latin American.7 One of the reasons for the high rate of ratification in Latin America is 
that the particular history of the continent makes determining exactly who are 
“indigenous” relatively unproblematic, something which is not the case in Africa and 
Asia. Another reason is the concerted lobbying for ratification by Latin American 
indigenous organizations,8 taking advantage of a changing political climate. Political 
transitions in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s led to a wave of constitutional 
reforms, with new constitutions being adopted or old ones modified in countries like 
Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), 
Peru (1993), Argentina (1994) Mexico (modified 1995), Ecuador (1998), and Venezuela 
(1999).9 A major novelty in these constitutions was the recognition of the multiethnic, 
multicultural nature of Latin American society.10 The influence of the ILO Convention 
is marked in several of these constitutions, as they incorporate provisions protecting 
indigenous peoples’ cultural, social and economic integrity. The Colombian 
Constitution of 1991 is a good example, and one which merits further study.  
 
4  Anaya (2004) p. 59 
5  ILO Convention 169 (1989) art. 1.1(b) 
6  ibid. art. 1.2 
7  The following states have ratified ILO Convention 169 by May 2006: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Norway, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.   
8  Anaya (2004) p. 61 
9  Political Database of the Americas, (2005)  
10  Van Cott (2000) p. 207, Marino (2003) p. 50 
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1.2 Problem statement 
In this thesis, I will look at the development of indigenous peoples’ rights by the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia. I shall investigate how the legal framework 
established by the Colombian Constitution of 1991 protects indigenous peoples’ rights, 
and how the Constitutional Court has attempted to improve this protection by 
incorporating international human rights law and the perspectives of indigenous peoples 
in its interpretation of the Constitution. In this respect, special attention will be given to 
the Court’s use of anthropological research to help bridge the gap between the Western 
legal tradition and different cultural realities.  
Most human rights issues of indigenous peoples are connected to questions of land, due 
to the special nature of their relationship with their territories. With this in mind I will 
focus on the Constitutional Court’s cases involving lands and natural resources of 
indigenous peoples, and look at how the Court relates these questions to fundamental 
constitutional rights.  
After giving an account of relevant parts of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, I 
will proceed to evaluate the effectiveness of the Court’s efforts to ensure protection of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. In so doing I will look at the role of the Constitutional Court 
in Colombian society, and the relation of constitutional justice to social change. To that 
end I will introduce a concept invented by the Colombian jurist Esteban Restrepo, 
which merits a brief introduction: “Constitutionalization of daily life” refers to a process 
by which people’s consciousness about their constitutional rights is raised, as the 
language of the opinions of the Constitutional Court becomes a part of everyday life.11
I will point out positive legal and social effects of the Court’s endeavours, as well as 
indicate discrepancies between the status of indigenous peoples’ rights in the legal 
system and the actual human rights situation in the field. Finally I will investigate what 
contextual factors may help explain such discrepancies.    
1.3 Sources and methodology 
My main source is the case law of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, from which 
I’ve selected 19 especially illustrative cases dating from between 1992 and 2003, all in 
all approximately 800 pages of case law. The cases are chosen on the bases of thematic 
content, the rights involved and the nature of the Court’s reasoning, in an attempt to 
 
11  This concept is further explained in chapter 4.2.1 
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indicate the general character of the Court’s jurisprudence as well as eventual 
incoherencies. Almost all the cases are thematically related to questions of land and 
natural resources, in an attempt to present the range of rights the Court relates to these 
issues. To my knowledge, I have included all of the Constitutional Court’s cases 
concerning lands and natural resources of indigenous peoples. A few cases are chosen 
because they are especially enlightening with regard to the Court’s view on cultural 
diversity and the limits to autonomy, despite not addressing land issues directly. As the 
Court frequently refers to its own case law to reiterate its position on recurring subject 
matters, certain landmark cases will be given more attention than others. 
The main legal source of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence is the Political 
Constitution of 1991. In addition, the Court frequently refers to international human 
rights treaties ratified by Colombia and jurisprudence of relevant human rights bodies. 
This body of law composing the Court’s main sources is termed the “constitutional 
corpus”12, and in my description of the Court’s practice this corpus of law will 
necessarily be a central source. Most prominent is the ILO Convention no. 169, which 
will be referred to throughout. To indicate how the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court stands in comparison to international law and jurisprudence on certain issues, I’ll 
consult the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); as 
well as General Comment no. 23 of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) and the Draft United Nations Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples. Following the Constitutional Court, I’ll refer to the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) as well as the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, specifically the “Awas Tingni” case.  
Background information on the human rights situation of indigenous peoples in 
Colombia and generally is taken from reports by United Nations Special Rapporteurs on 
Indigenous Peoples and independent human rights organizations.  
In addition, I will draw on academic literature from several fields, indicative of the 
inter-disciplinary nature of my research. From the field of law I consult literature related 
to indigenous peoples’ rights in Colombia and internationally, as well as to the legal 
system of Colombia, especially the institutions and procedures for constitutional justice. 
The relationship between law and anthropology, particularly how the Constitutional 
 
12  See chapter 2.3.1, infra, for a more detailed description of this concept. 
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Court has made use of the latter discipline in its case law, is investigated through 
literature from both fields.  
In order to assess the role of the Constitutional Court in society and its effectiveness in 
protecting constitutional rights, I will look at the relation between law and social change 
as described in recent Colombian literature on law and society.   
Finally, I draw on political and historical literature to interpret how the particular 
political situation in Colombia may affect the relation between legislation on and 
implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
1.4 Background 
1.4.1 A history of violence 
Colombia has been marked by violence and armed conflict, in different manifestations 
and degrees of intensity, since the 1940s. Nevertheless, during most of that time the 
country has experienced a political and economical stability uncommon for the region.13 
This has not, however, led to greater democratization; rather a powerful oligarchy has 
consolidated its dominance in the political as well as economic field.14 The State has for 
different reasons not been able to differentiate its interests from those of the ruling 
classes, and as such doesn’t appear as a legitimate mediator of social conflicts.15 A 
generalized lack of belief in the State institutions combined with weak social 
movements has resulted in social conflicts being acted out through violent means rather 
than in the political arena.16 An armed conflict broke out between the government and 
various guerrilla forces in the 1960s and is still on-going, fuelled by the drug trade. 
With the creation of paramilitary groups to aid in the counter-insurgent struggle, the 
conflict has become “the biggest humanitarian catastrophe in the Western hemisphere”, 
according to United Nations Under-Secretary General Jan Egeland.17
 
13  Rodríguez (2003) pp. 136-137  
14  ibid. p. 137 “Oligarchy” is here taken to mean a small segment of society which controls most of 
the country’s political and economic power, and whose power extends through generations. 
15  ibid. p. 138 
16  ibid. p. 139 
17  Press briefing on Colombia by Emergency Relief Coordinator (2004) 
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1.4.2 The indigenous population of Colombia 
Official Colombian figures place the indigenous population at approximately 785.000 
persons, representing 1,83 % of the total population of the country.18 This population is 
spread out through all the 32 departments of the country, and the cultural and 
demographic diversity within the indigenous minority is enormous. Different sources 
place the number of indigenous peoples between 81 and 90, as precise delimitation of 
related cultural and linguistic groups is difficult in some cases.19 Of these peoples, 39 
have a population of less than 1000 members, some of them even less than 100, and 
only four peoples have over 50 000 members.20 The huge geographic diversity of 
Colombia have contributed to very different living conditions and cultural 
characteristics of the country’s indigenous peoples, making general observations about 
their situation and their relationship to the majority society difficult to make. However, 
history shows that indigenous peoples have generally been treated as unequal citizens of 
Colombia, whether under the paternalistic protection system of the Spanish Crown or 
the assimilationist policies carried out by the State since independence in 1824. In the 
last fifty years, two trends stand out in the history of indigenous peoples: On the one 
hand there has been a growing recognition of their status as equal citizens and subjects 
of rights, beginning in the 1960s and gaining momentum with the new Constitution of 
1991. On the other, the internal, armed conflict has increasingly affected indigenous 
peoples all over the country, leading to an alarming escalation of violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law.21 Indigenous organizations have since the 
1970s taken an active role in fighting for their rights to land and cultural integrity, a 
process crowned with the participation of indigenous peoples in the Constitutional 
Assembly in 1991. A central claim has been legal recognition of their traditional lands, 
and since 1980 an increasingly coherent policy of granting collective ownership titles to 
indigenous reserves called resguardos has been established. As of December 2001, 638 
resguardos were in existence, with a population of 682.500 and a total area of 30,8 
million hectares, representing 27 % of the national territory.22 This legal recognition of 
collective titles has been central in strengthening indigenous peoples’ rights on a more 
general level. However, not all indigenous peoples enjoy the benefits. Some have not 
 
18  Sánchez (2004) p. 62 (Data from 2001) 
19  ibid. p. 69, Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 5 
20  Sánchez (2004) pp. 70-71 
21  Villa (2005) pp. 14-16 
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yet received title to their lands; others have clearly insufficient territories for the size of 
their population. Another frequent problem is the occupation of large parts of the 
resguardos by non-indigenous colonists, often cultivators of illicit crops.23
1.4.3 Main human rights issues of indigenous peoples  
1.4.3.1 Armed conflict and the drug industry 
The violence against indigenous peoples has augmented since the early 1990s, as they 
have been increasingly subjected to the logic of the internal armed conflict raging in the 
country. Over the past 15 years, more than 2660 cases of violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law aimed at indigenous peoples have been reported.24 The 
real figures are probably much higher, as many violations aren’t reported for fear of 
reprisals.25 Members of indigenous communities have been victims of massacres, 
forced recruitment, selective killings, forced disappearances and forced displacement of 
entire communities, and the rate of violence against indigenous persons is three times 
higher than the national average, already among the highest in the world.26 An 
estimated 12 % of Colombia’s displaced people are indigenous;27 and the special 
relationship of these peoples to their lands deepens the trauma of displacement. 
Indigenous leaders and spokespersons are being specifically targeted, apparently as part 
of a strategy to destroy the organizational capacity of their communities. Stavenhagen 
calls this practice of intentionally causing social and cultural disintegration of 
indigenous communities “truly acts of genocide and ethnocide”.28
The main violators are paramilitary groups (which have been linked with the army and 
government authorities29), but guerrilla forces and state security forces are also 
responsible for grave and systematic violations, as none of the armed actors respect the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants.30 In the polarized environment of 
the Colombian armed conflict, the indigenous communities’ efforts to remain neutral 
have led to them being suspected by all sides of collaborating with the enemy. In 
 
22  Sánchez (2004) p. 115 
23  Ortega (2000) p. 50 
24  Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 9 
25  ibid. p. 12 
26  Villa (2005) p.41-54 
27  Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 11 
28  ibid. p. 9 
29  ibid. 
30  ibid. p. 10; Villa (2005) p. 26   
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addition, their traditional territories often have strategic military importance, making the 
submission of the population a priority for the armed groups.  
The armed conflict in Colombia has become increasingly connected to cultivation and 
trafficking of illicit drugs,31 and territories of indigenous peoples have become invaded 
by the commercial plantations of the drug mafias, the paramilitaries and the guerrillas, 
with a resulting escalation of violence and environmental degradation. The influx of 
people connected to the drug business threatens to destroy the traditional way of life in 
indigenous areas, introducing an illicit money economy, weakening traditional authority 
and submitting inhabitants to “the rule of the gun”.32 On the other hand, the 
government’s policy of eradicating drug crops by glyphosate spraying is reported to 
cause severe environmental damage, in addition to destroying subsistence crops and 
causing direct harm to the health of the indigenous inhabitants, including birth defects.33  
1.4.3.2 Natural resource exploitation 
The natural environment of indigenous peoples in Colombia is under great pressure due 
to economic activities such as natural resource extraction and commercial farming, and 
to the construction of great infra-structure projects like dams and highways.34 The 
territories of indigenous peoples are in many cases largely unexploited lands, with 
enormous potential for economic gain. Colombia is among the most biologically diverse 
countries on earth, and the traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples 
have contributed greatly to this biological treasure remaining intact. Extractive 
industries like mining, oil drilling and logging are having seriously adverse effects on 
the environment, especially in fragile ecosystems like tropical rainforests, on which 
many indigenous peoples depend for their survival. Of special concern is the dire 
situation of the smallest indigenous groups, many of them on the brink of extinction as a 
result of the destruction of their living conditions and means of subsistence.35  
This situation is aggravated by the fact that many indigenous peoples still have 
unresolved claims for legal title to their lands, and even those that do live in legally 
constituted resguardos face difficulties in protecting their land. Ineffective institutions 
coupled with the strength of the economic interests involved often ensure that resource 
 
31  Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 13 
32  Ortega (2000) p. xxix 
33  ibid. p. xxix-xxx; Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 14 
34  Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 15 
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extraction projects are carried out without proper consultation of the indigenous 
inhabitants.36 In some areas, campaigns of systematic violence are being carried out 
against indigenous peoples that resist economic development of their territories, causing 
their forced displacement or virtual extinction. Financed by actors with vested economic 
interests in indigenous territories and carried out by paramilitary groups, such violence 
is intended to force indigenous communities into giving their formal acceptance of 
economic mega-projects on their land or, failing that, to displace the rightful owners of 
the land. The State has often been unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection 
against such violent coercion by private actors, as can be ascertained by the repeated 
requests by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for precautionary and 
provisional protection measures for indigenous communities.37
 
35  ibid. p. 16 Of the indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon, 40 % are thought to be at high 
or very high risk, and at least 12 are close to extinction. See: ONIC (2006)  
36  Stavenhagen (2004a) p. 16. 
37  See i.e. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2001); Resolución sobre Medidas 
Provisionales: Caso Pueblo Indígena Kankuamo (2004)  
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2 The Constitution of 1991 and the role of the Constitutional Court 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide background information on the general content and character 
of the Constitution of 1991 and the judicial mechanisms created to ensure its 
implementation. In addition, the role of the Constitutional Court and the general 
character of its practice in its first 15 years of existence will be introduced. The 
Constitution’s treatment of indigenous peoples’ rights will be analyzed within the 
framework of the international human right to self-determination, drawing on Anaya’s 
arguments on how this right relates to indigenous peoples. 
2.2 The Constitution of 1991 
Reflecting the Colombian population’s weariness of corruption and violence, in 1990 
wide-spread social pressure spearheaded by the student movement demanded the 
creation of a new, more inclusive and democratic constitution, which could help 
reconcile the social forces and re-establish and legitimize the political order in the 
country.38 Upon seeing the massive popular support this initiative received in a 
referendum the same year, the government issued measures summoning the National 
Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly was composed of representatives from a wide 
range of social and political sectors of Colombian society; workers, academics, 
students, the traditional political oligarchy, indigenous peoples (for the first time 
participating in a political decision-making process of national importance) and 
representatives of recently demobilized guerrilla groups.39  
The Constitution that was finally adopted on July 4 1991 was progressive in its social 
and democratic content. It included an extensive bill of fundamental rights; political, 
social, economic, cultural, environmental and collective, and established efficient 
mechanisms for their protection.40 The fundamental principles of the Constitution 
declared Colombia to be a “social state of law”, “democratic, participatory and 
 
38  Restrepo (2002) p. 3; Rodríguez (2003) p. 141 
39  Restrepo (2002) p. 3; Rodríguez (2003) p. 141 
40  Restrepo (2002) p. 3; Rodríguez (2003) p. 157 
  12 
                                                
pluralist”, and “founded on the respect for human dignity.”41 Special attention was 
given to the principle of equality of all citizens, with article 13 establishing the special 
right to protection of “marginalized and oppressed groups” and prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, national or family origin, language, religion, 
political and philosophical opinion.42  
2.2.1 Judicial mechanisms for protection of constitutional rights 
Chapter 4 of the Constitution established a series of judicial mechanisms designed to 
protect the constitutional rights of the citizens.43 Of these, the mechanism of acción de 
tutela (hereinafter tutela) has proven to be the most important in terms of access and 
effectiveness.44 Van Cott translates tutela as “writ of protection”, and calls it “the 
citizen’s primary defence against the violation of fundamental constitutional rights”.45 
Created in article 86 of the Constitution, it permits all persons whose fundamental rights 
are threatened by the action or omission of any public authority, to claim the immediate 
protection of those rights (Even when the actual threat or damage to the person’s rights 
is coming from an individual or a private entity).46 Generally, the “fundamental” rights 
of the Constitution are civil and political rights rather than social or cultural rights. 
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has established that the legal 
action of tutela can be employed whenever the right being violated is directly connected 
with a fundamental right.47 It is a fast-track procedure whose aim is to prevent 
irreparable harm from occurring to the plaintiff. Cases must be resolved within ten days 
of their registration, and the tutela mechanism can only be employed when no other 
legal mechanism is available or when there is an immediate danger of irreparable harm 
to a fundamental right. As long as these necessary conditions are met, the Constitutional 
Court has determined that the mechanism can be employed by any person, legal as well 
as physical.48 Tutela actions can be brought before any judge in the country, and 
decisions may be appealed to a higher court. All tutela decisions reach the 
 
41  Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) art. 1 (My translation) 
42  Restrepo (2002) p. 3 
43  In contrast, the previous constitution had a very inadequate list of rights and no mechanisms for 
their direct application. See Rodríguez (2003) p. 157 
44  In the first ten years of the new Constitution, over 450 000 tutelas were brought before the 
courts. See ibid. pp. 156-162 for an empirical analysis of the tutela action. 
45  Van Cott (2000) p. 213 
46  Rodríguez (2003) p. 158 
47  ibid. p. 159 
48  Sentence T-257/93, section II.3 
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Constitutional Court, which reviews those that it considers most important 
(approximately 1 percent of all cases).49 The Constitutional Court’s rulings are both 
final and of mandatory compliance.  
In addition to tutelas, the people of Colombia may seek a ruling of the Constitutional 
Court through the public action of unconstitutionality.50 This legal action requests that 
the Court declare unconstitutional a law or a decree with the force of law, and doesn’t 
require any violation of the plaintiff’s rights for the case to be presented.  
Two other mechanisms exist for the protection of constitutional rights: One of them 
(acción de cumplimiento) gives citizens the right to use the Court system to demand the 
fulfilment of laws or administrative regulations, in cases where negligence or tardiness 
of authorities leads to a serious damage to the person.51 The other is the public action of 
protection of collective rights (hereinafter acción popular), related to the fields of public 
health and order, the environment, free economic competition etc.52 None of these two 
mechanisms are the competence of the Constitutional Court. 
2.3 The role of the Constitutional Court in the defence of human rights 
The 1991 Constitution created the Constitutional Court and charged it with “guarding 
the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution”.53 Ever since its inception, the Court 
has worked to ensure that the principles of the Constitution do not remain just words on 
paper, but instead become effective guarantees of the rights of ordinary citizens.54 Its 
efforts have often been involved in controversy, as powerful sectors of society and even 
of the judicial branch have resisted its independence and the progressive manner in 
which the Court has interpreted both the Constitution and the scope of its mandate.55 Its 
expansive understanding of human rights and the importance of constitutional justice 
for their protection has prompted writers like Rodríguez-Garavito to call it “the 
vanguard of an activist judiciary and a progressive ‘new constitutionalism’”.56 
Throughout its history, the Court has made many controversial decisions protecting 
individuals’ rights, such as the decriminalization of drug consumption and euthanasia.57 
 
49  Rodríguez (2003) p. 159 
50  Restrepo (2002) p. 7; Rodríguez (2003) p. 157 
51  Rodríguez (2003) p. 177 
52  Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) art. 88 
53  ibid. art. 241(My translation) 
54  Restrepo (2002) p. 4 
55  Rodríguez (2003) p. 157  
56  Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) p. 251 
57  Rodríguez (2003) p. 157 
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It has also placed great emphasis on the protection of vulnerable and traditionally 
discriminated groups or minorities, such as women, indigenous peoples, afro-
Colombian communities, AIDS patients, homosexuals, children, the elderly, 
handicapped persons, prisoners and religious minorities.58  Another important aspect of 
the work of the Constitutional Court has been to combat authoritarian tendencies in 
Colombian institutions on all levels, especially restricting the use of state of emergency 
powers by the executive.59  
The finding that any kind of right, including economic, social and cultural rights, can be 
subject of tutela if it’s directly connected to a fundamental right is significant, as it 
opens the doors of the judicial system to the very real and immediate social and 
economic needs of the population, such as the right to health and dignified housing 
standards.60  
In sum, it can be said that the judicial activism of the Constitutional Court has seen it 
align itself with the oppressed groups of society, challenging the traditional power-
holders of Colombia.61 This does not mean that the Court has allowed itself to become 
an instrument of politics, other than in the sense that upholding the principles of the 
Constitution necessarily implies taking an active stand in the struggle for a more just 
and equal society.  
A salient characteristic of the Court’s efforts to protect the integrity of the Constitution 
is its practice of interpreting the constitutional rights in accordance with the social, 
cultural and political context of each case, including drawing upon philosophy and 
social sciences to throw light on the meaning of the constitutional provisions in each 
particular situation.  
2.3.1 The “constitutional corpus” 
Article 93 of the Constitution declares that international treaties and conventions on 
human rights that have been ratified by Congress have prevalence in the national legal 
 
58  ibid. p. 157; Restrepo (2002) p. 4 
59  Although Colombia has rarely seen its constitutional democratic order disrupted by dictatorships, 
the use of special powers under states of emergency was almost a constant during the last half of the 20th 
century. For 32 of the 42 years between 1949 and 1991 a state of emergency was in force in Colombia. 
See Rodríguez (2003) p. 144 and Restrepo (2002) p. 4 
60  The social inequalities in Colombia are huge and well entrenched. 64 % of the population exist 
below the national poverty line. 22,6 % live on less than 2 $ a day, while 8,2 % live on less than 1 $ a 
day. Colombia has a score of 57,6 on the Gini index, measuring (in)equality of distribution of wealth. 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2005) 
61  Restrepo (2002) p. 4 
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hierarchy. Further, that the rights and duties of the Constitution shall be interpreted in 
accordance with international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia. The 
Constitutional Court has elaborated on this article in order to clarify the status of 
international human rights norms vis-à-vis the Constitution. In so doing it introduces the 
concept of “constitutional corpus”:  
The constitutional corpus is composed of those norms and principles that, 
without being explicitly stated in the articles of the constitutional text, 
have been normatively integrated with the Constitution by different 
mechanisms and in accordance with the Constitution, and are used as 
parameters of control of the constitutionality of the laws. They are true 
principles and values of constitutional rank (…).62  
The Court has later clarified that the constitutional corpus consists of the Political 
Constitution; all treaties of human rights and international humanitarian law ratified by 
Colombia; as well as the jurisprudence of the international organs charged with the 
interpretation of those treaties (the United Nations treaty bodies, the ILO committees, 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.)63 This greatly enhances the potential for effective legal protection of 
human rights in Colombia, and prevents using reference to internal laws as excuse for 
non-compliance with international human rights law. When the Constitution was 
created, it was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly that Congress should create 
implementing legislation for the bill of rights included in the Constitution.64 In some 
cases, even 15 years later, this has still not happened,65 leaving the text of the 
Constitution as the only source of interpretation of the scope and content of 
constitutional rights. In this context it is clear that the work of the Constitutional Court 
has been made easier by article 93’s provision of interpreting the rights and duties in the 
Constitution in accordance with international human rights treaties. An example of this 
is the frequent reference to ILO Convention 169 in cases involving indigenous peoples, 
as well as to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
62  Sentence C-225/95 (My translation) 
63  Sentence T-568/99; Sentence C-010/00 
64  See i.e. Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) art. 329 (on indigenous territories and other 
territorial entities of the State) and art. 246 (on coordination of indigenous and national law). On the latter 
subject, see Van Cott (2000) pp. 215-217. 
65  This is the case with i.e. The Organic Law of Territorial Regulation (Ley de Ordenamiento 
Territorial), which art. 329 of the Constitution states shall regulate the coordination and relations between 
indigenous territories and other territorial entities of the State. 
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2.4 Indigenous peoples and self-determination in the Constitution of 1991 
2.4.1 Self-determination of indigenous peoples 
Underlying the struggle for indigenous peoples’ rights is the question of self-
determination, which has been subject of widely differing interpretations since it was set 
down in common article 1 of ICCPR and ICESCR in 1966:  
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.66   
Self-determination is generally considered a principle of customary international law 
and even jus cogens, a peremptory norm. (Peremptory norms are considered so 
fundamental that no nations may derogate from them whatever the circumstances, 
irrespective of their treaty obligations.) Governments have been, and many to some 
extent still are, very reluctant to the idea that indigenous groups should be considered 
“peoples” with the right to self-determination. This fact is partly responsible for the 
extra-ordinary difficulties in agreeing on the text for the United Nations Declaration on 
Indigenous Peoples, as delegates of governments and indigenous peoples’ organizations 
argue about whether to call the groups in question “people”, “peoples” or even 
“populations”. The drafters of ILO Convention 169 avoided the problem by inserting a 
qualifying clause in article 1.3: “The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not 
be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the 
term under international law” (emphasis in the original).  
According to Anaya the resistance against acknowledging the right of indigenous 
peoples to self-determination is based on the misconception that self-determination 
equals a right to independent state-hood.67 This misunderstanding is due to the political 
context in which the right to self-determination was first invoked, that is the process of 
decolonization which led to a host of new states being founded. However, this particular 
characteristic of the decolonization process was a remedial and not a substantive 
 
66  ICCPR (1966) art. 1 and ICESCR (1966) art. 1 
67  Anaya (2004) p. 103 
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element of self-determination.68 It was intended to remedy the historic suppression of 
the right to self-determination of colonized peoples, and independent statehood was the 
preferred option in that particular historic context. Indigenous peoples all over the world 
have been oppressed for centuries and to a large extent continue to live in conditions of 
marginalization and inequality, and there is no morally relevant difference between 
them and other colonized peoples. Nevertheless, the appropriate remedial measures to 
ensure their self-determination may not be secession and independent statehood. Indeed 
it would in most cases be a cure worse than the disease, as Anaya puts it.69  
Anaya rejects the dichotomy of internal (rights of political participation) vs. external 
(freedom from alien rule) self-determination, as it builds on a conception of “peoples” 
as mutually exclusive spheres of community, organized by statehood.70 This conception 
inadequately captures the multiple patterns of human association that exist in the 
world,71 and Anaya instead proposes a substantive/remedial approach to self-
determination.72  He argues that the substance of self-determination consists of two 
normative strains: the constitutive aspect which requires that the creation of governing 
institutions reflect the will of the people concerned,73 while the on-going aspect of self-
determination requires a governing order in which people may participate meaningfully 
in all spheres of their lives on a continuous basis.74 The need for remedial self-
determination arises from the historic and continuing denial of the substantive elements 
of self-determination to a people, and the appropriate remedy is group- and context 
specific,75 as illustrated by the comparison between indigenous peoples and other 
colonized peoples.  
2.4.2 Constitutional provisions for self-determination of indigenous 
communities  
The participation of indigenous representatives in the Constitutional Assembly secured 
the introduction of a series of articles outlining the special rights and legal status of 
indigenous peoples in the Constitution of 1991. To assess whether the Constitution 
 
68  ibid. p. 104 
69  ibid. p. 109 
70  ibid. p. 105; Ostby (2003) p. 235 
71  Anaya (2004) p. 105 
72  Ostby (2003) p. 234 
73  Anaya (2004) p. 104-105 
74  ibid. p. 106 
75  ibid. pp. 106-107; Ostby (2003) p. 235 
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reflects the unique needs and interests of indigenous peoples, it is useful to analyze it 
within the framework of Anaya’s concept of self-determination. In Anaya’s analysis, 
substantive self-determination contains five elements: non-discrimination, cultural 
integrity, security of lands and natural resources, self-government and entitlements of 
social welfare and development.76  All these subjects are addressed in the Colombian 
Constitution of 1991, and most are elaborated on by the Constitutional Court in its 
jurisprudence, as we shall see in chapter 3.  
The Constitution does not use the term “self-determination”, but the provisions 
outlining the autonomy given to indigenous communities indicate that the 
Constitutional Assembly embraced a version of self-determination similar to that 
described by Anaya. The reference in article 1 to the pluralist character of the State and 
the recognition in article 7 of the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian Nation, 
using “Nation” in the singular, speak of ethnically and culturally diverse human groups 
sharing a common identity: that of belonging to the overarching Colombian nation.77 
The Constitution thus recognizes the multiethnic and multicultural character of the State 
and protects the right to diversity of the national minorities.78 This is a recognition of 
the multiple, overlapping and interdependent spheres of community and identity that 
Anaya says characterizes the human experience,79 and as such it differs from the more 
restrictive view of self-determination as the domain of mutually exclusive cultural 
groups which depend on independent statehood to be able to “freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development”.80  
Further provisions were inserted into the Constitution to ensure that equal treatment and 
respect be given to all individuals and groups, including special protection of vulnerable 
minorities. Article 8 declares the State duty to protect the cultural and natural wealth of 
the nation, which the Constitutional Court has interpreted to include the protection of 
indigenous peoples and their natural environment. The equal respect for the different 
cultures of the country (articles 13 and 70), is further developed in the recognition of 
indigenous languages as official in their territories and the right to a bilingual education 
(article 10) that respects and develops the cultural identity of minority ethnic groups 
(article 68).  
 
76  Ostby (2003) p. 235; Anaya (2004) p. 129 
77  Sentence T-634/99, section II.1.3 
78  Marino (2003) p. 53 
79  Anaya (2004) p. 101 
80  ICCPR (1966) and ICESCR (1966) art. 1.1 
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Article 1’s reference to the pluralist, democratic and participative character of the State 
and to the autonomy of its territorial entities includes the key elements of the norm of 
self-government, which Anaya calls “the over-arching political dimension of on-going 
self-determination”81:  
In the particular context of indigenous peoples, notions of democracy 
(including decentralized government) and of cultural integrity join to 
create a sui generis self-government norm. The norm includes two distinct 
but interrelated strains. One upholds spheres of governmental or 
administrative autonomy for indigenous communities; the other seeks to 
ensure the effective participation of those communities in all decisions 
affecting them that are left to the larger institutions of decision making.82
These elements are further developed in the Constitution, as summed up by the 
Constitutional Court in case T-188/93 of 1993: 
The indigenous communities, “groups of families of Amerindian descent 
that identify themselves with their aboriginal past and maintain traits and 
values of their traditional culture, as well as forms of government and 
social control that distinguish them from other rural communities” 
(Decree 2001 of 1988, art.2), enjoy a special constitutional status. They 
form a special constituency for the election of Senators and 
Representatives (articles 171 and 176), they exercise jurisdictional 
functions within their territories in accordance with their own norms and 
procedures, as long as they’re not contrary to the Constitution or the laws 
(article 246), they are governed by indigenous councils in accordance 
with their customs and practices and in conformity with the Constitution 
and the law (article 330) and their territories or resguardos are their 
collective property, by nature inalienable, imprescriptible and unseizable 
(articles 63 and 329).83
The two-fold requirement of participation and autonomy is explicitly addressed; as on 
the one hand indigenous peoples are guaranteed a minimum of representatives in 
Congress,84 and on the other they are given autonomy to rule their own affairs within 
their territories. Many indigenous communities maintain traditional governing 
institutions and systems of social control, including mechanisms for conflict resolution 
 
81  Anaya (2004) p. 150 
82  ibid. p. 151 
83  Sentence T-188/93, section II.1. The definition of indigenous communities referred to was 
introduced in Presidential Decree 2001 of 1988, enacted the year before ILO Convention 169 was created. 
As the Constitution doesn’t include a definition of indigenous peoples, the Constitutional Court has 
generally taken the definition of Decree 2001 as point of reference. However, the definition of indigenous 
and tribal peoples employed in the ILO Convention is also considered valid by the Court, allowing for 
afro-Colombian communities, the largest among the ethnic minorities of the country, to be covered by the 
ILO Convention as a “tribal people”. See Sentence C-169/01, section V.3.2.2 
84  Indigenous candidates may participate in the ordinary, territorially-based election for seats in 
Congress. But as a minimum indigenous peoples are guaranteed one seat in the House of Representatives 
and two seats in the Senate, elected from a special indigenous constituency. See arts. 171 and 176 of the 
Constitution and art. 1 of Law 649 (2001). Also see Sentence C-169/01. 
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and adjudication.85 As a logical consequence of the constitutional principle of cultural 
pluralism, indigenous communities have the right to govern themselves according to 
their own precepts, whether they take the form of traditional customary law or rather as 
norms of more contemporary origin, chosen by the community in adaptation to their 
changing circumstances. The autonomy of indigenous communities is limited 
geographically by the boundaries of their territories, and legally by the principles of the 
Constitution. This legal limit could in practice easily contradict the principles of 
protection of jurisdictional autonomy and cultural integrity, as the Constitution and the 
laws belong to a Western, liberal frame of reference which frequently contrasts with 
customary law of indigenous peoples. In order to make sure that the autonomy of 
indigenous peoples isn’t reduced to a hollow concept without real effectiveness, the 
Constitutional Court has ruled that the autonomy and cultural integrity of indigenous 
peoples may only be restricted to protect even more fundamental constitutional 
principles or international human rights, such as the right to life, freedom from slavery 
and torture, and national security.86  
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The Constitution of 1991 is a very progressive legal document of a markedly social and 
democratic nature. The popularity of the tutela action indicates that constitutional 
justice has become a favoured way for seeking protection of fundamental rights, making 
the Constitutional Court an important institution in Colombian society. 
With regard to the situation of indigenous peoples, we find that all the substantive 
elements of self-determination, as defined by Anaya, are addressed in the Constitution. 
However, the broad and general character of the constitutional principles as well as the 
lack of implementing legislation, have made it necessary for the Constitutional Court to 
carry out an extensive labour of interpreting the scope, content and weight of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in Colombia. The Court’s rulings on the relative weight of 
cultural diversity versus other constitutional rights are but one example. Chapter 3 will 
focus on the important efforts of the Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution in 
accordance with the principle of cultural diversity, and by logical connection also try to 
achieve the fulfilment of substantive self-determination of indigenous peoples. 
 
85  Anaya (2004) pp. 151-152 
86  See i.e. Sentence T-523/97; Sentence T-349/96; Van Cott (2000) pp. 217-218; and Botero (2004) 
pp. 70-76. 
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3 The Constitutional Court’s development of indigenous peoples’ rights 
3.1 Indigenous peoples as collective subjects of rights 
The Constitution of 1991 recognizes both individual and collective rights, and different 
mechanisms for their protection were outlined in chapter 2. In the case of indigenous 
peoples, the community takes on a special importance which is not adequately reflected 
by the dichotomy individual-collective. In the landmark case T-380/93 of 1993, the 
Court declared that an indigenous community is in itself a holder of fundamental 
rights.87 The bases for this finding are the Constitution’s articles 1, 7 and 8, which 
declare Colombia to be a pluralist State that recognizes and protects the ethnic and 
cultural diversity and the cultural wealth of the Colombian nation.88  In order to 
adequately protect this diversity, it is necessary to try to understand the many different 
ways of life and forms of comprehending the world of the minority ethnic groups 
existing in the country. In the case of indigenous peoples, the Court accepts that 
individual members of these communities to a large extent achieve their personal 
realization through their group. For some indigenous peoples, an existence separated 
from the community would be incomprehensible, as it is only as integral parts of a 
whole that the individual may live meaningfully. This is one of the reasons why the 
concept of individual human rights is not always easily understood or accepted by 
indigenous peoples,89 especially those who’ve been relatively isolated from Western 
systems of thought. To quote the Court:  
To restrict the recognition of fundamental rights to belong exclusively to 
individuals, dismissing systems of thought that don’t allow an 
individualist understanding of the human person, would be contrary to the 
constitutional principles of democracy, pluralism, respect for ethnic and 
cultural diversity and protection of the cultural wealth of the nation.90  
The existence of the community as an integrated whole transcends that of its individual 
members and depends on a variety of factors, both material and spiritual. It may be 
 
87  Sentence T-380/93, section. II.8. I shall return to this case throughout, at this moment I will only 
address the question of the community as a rights-holder. 
88  Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) 
89  Ekern (2003) p. 12 
90  Sentence T-380/93, section II.8 (My translation) 
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affected by external factors such as war or changes in its natural habitat, or by internal 
dynamics such as power struggles and factional disputes. In this line of thought the 
community as a subject has vital interests on which its existence depends, and those 
interests might differ from the interests of some community members. In order to 
adequately protect this collective form of existence the community as a whole must be 
granted the status of rights holder. In the opinion of the Court, the constitutional 
guarantee of recognition and protection of ethnic and cultural diversity would amount to 
mere rhetoric if indigenous communities weren’t also granted legal personality with 
which to defend their fundamental rights91: 
The defence of diversity cannot be carried out with a paternalist attitude, 
nor be held victim by the actions of individual members of the 
community, when it is the very community that may find its sphere of 
vital interests negatively affected. For this reason the community must 
assume the protection of its own rights and the defence against damage or 
threats that could lead to its extinction (Constitution arts. 1 and 7).92
This move away from paternalism to full recognition of indigenous communities as 
subjects of rights is an important victory in indigenous peoples’ struggle for autonomy. 
As groups, indigenous communities have fundamental rights much like those of 
individuals. Although these by definition are collective rights, the Court emphasizes that 
they mustn’t be confused with the collective rights of other groups, such as the national 
community as a whole. “The indigenous community is a collective subject and not a 
mere sum of individuals that share certain rights and general interests”.93 This is why 
indigenous communities may use the mechanism of tutela in order to have their 
fundamental rights protected, whereas ordinary collective rights are to be protected 
through the mechanism of acción popular.94  
The indigenous communities’ own authorities are endowed with the power to act as the 
communities’ legal representatives. However, conditions of geographic isolation, 
economic weakness and scant knowledge of the legal system of the majority society 
often makes indigenous communities choose to be represented by external specialists, a 
practice the Court considers to be justified.95 In many tutela cases brought before the 
Constitutional Court, human rights organizations have provided legal and administrative 
 
91  ibid. section II.8. 
92  ibid. (My translation) 
93  ibid.  
94  The Court’s jurisprudence is not entirely consistent on this point. See note 147, infra. 
95  Sentence T-380/93, section II.9 
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aid to the communities involved.96 In other cases, public authorities such as the 
Ombudsman’s office and the Procurator General’s office have represented indigenous 
communities in tutela proceedings, even against other state institutions.97   
3.2 The powers and legitimacy of indigenous leaders 
Article 330 of the Constitution declares that indigenous territories shall be governed by 
“councils”, the form and regulations of which shall be in accordance with the customs 
and practices of their communities. These authorities are given a series of functions to 
exercise, in addition to whatever responsibilities they may be given by their 
communities. Among the functions they are given by the Constitution, indigenous 
authorities must watch over the preservation of the natural resources in their territories, 
collect and distribute economic resources, design policies and plans for economic and 
social development of their territories and act as community representatives. The 
Constitution does not specify any one kind of traditional authority, but leaves that open 
to the customary practices of each indigenous people. However, the most common form 
of leadership of resguardos in Colombia today is the cabildo, a form of community 
council originally created by the colonial authorities to represent the indigenous 
communities in an area, and later adopted and retained by the communities themselves. 
The institution was officially recreated by the Colombian government in 1988, when 
Presidential Decree no. 2001 defined them thus: “The indigenous cabildos are special 
public entities charged with legally representing their groups and exercising the 
functions given to them by the law, their customs and practices.”98  
The cabildos have generally been seen by state institutions as the default indigenous 
authorities with which to interact, but an important case of the Constitutional Court 
from 1998 has questioned this. Case T-652/98 dealt with a tutela demanding protection 
of the fundamental rights of the Embera-Katío people of the Alto Sinú region. This 
people inhabit small villages scattered throughout their ancestral territory, which for 
administrative reasons of the State was divided into two resguardos instead of one at 
the time of formalization of their collective property.  
In the 1990s, large parts of their territory were flooded by a dam that was constructed as 
part of a major hydro-electrical project. As no process of prior consultation had been 
 
96  i.e. ibid., Sentence T-652/98, Sentence SU-383/03 
97  i.e. Sentence SU-039/97  
98  Presidential Decree 2001 (1988) art 2. Cited in Sentence T-652/98, section 7 a) 
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carried out with the affected communities, the private company building the dam and 
the State institutions responsible for granting the environmental license for the project 
were held responsible for violations of a number of fundamental rights.  
At the time of the establishment of the two resguardos, the communities of each 
resguardo had formed a cabildo mayor to represent them. However, internal differences 
of the communities led to discontent with the leadership, and in one of the resguardos 
an alternative cabildo mayor was established. As a result of this internal power struggle, 
the local state authorities chose to freeze all contracts with the indigenous communities 
until the question of authority was resolved.  
In the Court’s treatment of the case, it was established that the traditional political 
organization of the Embera-Katíos is decentralized; traditional authority being held by 
leaders of extended families that share villages in a communitarian manner. There is no 
tradition in the Embera-Katío culture for accepting a higher political authority than the 
village, except for fleeting alliances to counter common threats such as invasion.99 The 
Constitutional Court considered that the local authorities’ insistence on only accepting 
the legal authority of a cabildo mayor amounted to pressuring the Embera-Katíos to 
accept an alien form of government, through which they were not able to protect their 
interests properly and which eventually led to a harmful internal struggle.100 In the 
opinion of the Court, this was a violation of the Embera-Katío people’s right to resolve 
its internal affairs autonomously. As stated above, article 330 of the Constitution does 
not require that an indigenous community be governed by a cabildo, but by the 
traditional form of authority accepted by the people in question. In the case of the 
Embera-Katíos of the Alto Sinú this would be the council of each village, whose 
authority must be recognized by the State authorities if the special political traditions of 
the Embera-Katío people are to be respected.101  
This clearly shows that the Court looks to the protection of the rights and interests of the 
indigenous community or people as a whole, and will not accept reference to internal 
power disputes as an excuse for non-compliance with the state duty to protect the rights 
of indigenous peoples. The Court found the State to have contributed to the political 
crisis of the Embera-Katío people, and ordered it to respect its cultural and political 
characteristics in order to adequately protect the fundamental rights of the communities. 
 
99  Sentence T-652/98, section 7 
100  ibid. section 7 a) 
101  ibid. section 7 b) 
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In case T-380/93, in which the Court elaborated on the indigenous community as a 
collective subject of rights, it also addressed the subject of illegitimate actions by 
community leaders. As stated above, certain interests of individual community members 
may contradict the interests of the community as a whole, and, as in all societies, the 
actions of indigenous leaders may in many cases jeopardize the well-being of the 
community. In the case under discussion, certain members of the cabildo of the 
Chajeradó community of the Embera-Katío people of the Medio Atrato region had, 
without the community’s approval, given permission to the logging company 
MADARIEN to cut down forest on the territory of the resguardo. MADARIEN 
subsequently exploited around 4000 hectares of tropical rain forest on the resguardo, 
severely damaging the ecosystem on which the Embera-Katío people depend for their 
survival.102  
The community, with the aid of the NGO Organización Indígena de Antioquia, 
presented a tutela claiming that their collective rights to life, work, property and ethnic, 
cultural and economic integrity had been violated. The Constitutional Court held that 
the autonomy of indigenous peoples does not give the representatives of these 
communities unlimited powers with respect to disposing of the natural resources of their 
territories, but rather entails responsibilities to protect the best interests of the 
community. Article 330 of the Constitution specifically creates a duty of indigenous 
authorities to safeguard the preservation of the natural resources in their territories. In 
cases where indigenous leaders illegally or arbitrarily dispose of the lands or natural 
resources of the community, the Court applies the principle of ultra vires, meaning 
“beyond powers.” It refers to conduct that exceeds the powers granted by the law, and 
thus can’t be held as valid or legally binding.103  
The obligation to protect indigenous communities from harmful actions by community 
members as well as from external pressures is also made clear in the recognition of 
collective land rights of indigenous peoples, as the Constitution in articles 63 and 329 
declares indigenous resguardos to be inalienable, imprescriptible and unseizable.104 
This means that they cannot be sold, given away, expropriated, confiscated or in any 
other manner be removed from the indigenous communities’ ownership and control. 
These provisions legally prevent indigenous leaders from in any way relinquishing the 
 
102  Sentence T-380/93, section II. 5 
103  ibid., section II.13 
104  Tomei (1996), section 2, box 5 
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collective property of their communities, and as such invite the invocation of the 
principle of ultra vires if an attempt to do so should be made. This norm is not intended 
to diminish the autonomy of indigenous communities, but instead addresses concerns 
that conditions of seriously unequal bargaining power may lead to unfair transactions 
between indigenous peoples and others.105 It is especially important in a context of 
armed conflict and widespread violence such as in Colombia, where forced 
displacement and armed coercion are common-place in the struggle for control over 
coveted territories.  
3.3 The Meanings of Territory 
Of the rights of indigenous communities guaranteed by the Constitution, the collective 
right to property of lands and territories is essential. As explained in chapter 2,106 the 
Constitution explicitly recognizes the collective property relation of indigenous peoples 
to their lands, and attaches a set of special rights to be exercised within these territorial 
boundaries. The Constitutional Court has on repeated occasions taken the opportunity to 
elaborate on the meaning and content of this right, which is not only important in itself 
but also instrumental in protecting other, fundamental rights.  In case T-188/93 of 1993, 
the Court stated that the collective right to property of their territories carries special 
importance for the cultural and spiritual values of indigenous peoples.107 In doing so, it 
made explicit reference to ILO Convention no. 169, which in article 13.1 states the 
following: 
In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention governments 
shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of 
the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or 
both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular 
the collective aspects of this relationship.  
The Court went on to explain that the special importance of the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their territories owes not only to the fact that these contain the 
material basis for their subsistence, but also because they are integral elements in the 
cosmovision and religion of indigenous peoples. In addition, the Court referred to the 
preparatory works of the Constitutional Assembly to explain the meaning and 
importance of this right. It quoted indigenous representative Fransisco Rojas Birry, who 
stated that “without rights to territory, fundamental rights to cultural identity and 
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autonomy would be mere formalities. [Indigenous peoples] need the territory they live 
in to survive and to develop their culture.”108
Based on considerations such as the above, the Court declared that the right of 
indigenous peoples to collective property of their territories is a fundamental right 
which, together with the constitutional principle of protection of ethnic and cultural 
diversity, implicitly encompasses a right to having their lands given legal status of 
resguardos.109 This right includes the collective ownership of renewable and non-
renewable natural resources in their territories,110 except sub-surface resources, which 
according to the Constitution belong to the State.111   
3.3.1 Anthropological perspectives on the meanings of territory 
The Court has often cited cases T-188/93 and T-380/93 when considering new 
questions related to indigenous peoples’ territories. But since those cases were written, 
the Court has had the opportunity to elaborate further on the various aspects of the 
importance of territory to indigenous peoples. In so doing, the magistrates of the Court 
have understood the necessity of interpreting the Constitution so as to also make sense 
in cultures radically different from the Western society within which its own legal 
tradition developed. From the Constitution’s guarantee to recognize and protect the 
cultural diversity of the nation (art. 7), the Court derives its duty to fill its legal terms 
with meanings wide enough to encompass all the different cultures of Colombia. As a 
straight-forward interpretation of the letter of the law could in some cases lead to 
absurdities when transported from one cultural context to another, the Court’s challenge 
has been to always maintain present the object and purpose of the laws in question.   
But even this may not be enough as such intercultural interpretations require a thorough 
understanding of the different cultures involved in any given case. It cannot seriously be 
expected of Court magistrates to possess the necessary degree of knowledge for the 
hermeneutical challenge of interpreting rights of all minority groups of Colombia within 
their particular cultural context. Recognizing both that cases involving fundamental 
rights of indigenous peoples cannot be adjudicated merely by interpretation of legal 
texts, and that the legalistic horizon of understanding of the judges would be inadequate 
 
107  Sentence T-188/93, section II.1 
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to provide the missing elements of comprehension, the Court has sought help from other 
disciplines to bolster its multicultural competence.112 Both anthropology and moral 
political philosophy have become important elements in the Court’s jurisprudence, as 
well as the use of in situ hearings, field investigations and expert opinions by 
anthropologists, biologists, geologists etc.113  
The Cristianía case of 1992114 is illustrative in this respect. The State was carrying out 
construction work on a highway passing through the indigenous resguardo of 
Cristianía, without having consulted the indigenous community beforehand. The 
resguardo was located on a geological fault line and the construction work caused shifts 
in the landmass, changing the course of the resguardo’s river and severely damaging 
several buildings used for the community’s agricultural practices. The Court sent its 
own representatives to investigate the local conditions, and requested expert opinions 
from anthropologists and geologists. To satisfactorily establish the physical facts of the 
case, geologists were consulted on the conditions of the land itself, its degree of 
instability etc., and how the road works could be said to have caused the damages. Both 
short- and potential long-term effects were studied, especially how the changed river 
course would affect the basic conditions for the economic practices of the community. 
Anthropologists were consulted on how the seriously negative impacts on the economic 
model of the community could violate the right to economic, social and cultural 
integrity and lead to the disintegration and eventual disappearance of the community. 
Based on these deliberations, the Court ordered the road works to be suspended until an 
environmental impact assessment had been carried out and it could be positively 
assured that no further damages could occur. In addition the community was to receive 
compensation payment for the damages.  
The elements of this case have repeatedly been brought up in the Court’s jurisprudence 
and were later reinforced in case T-380/93. At the moment what is important to 
emphasize is how the Court has taken upon itself the duty to engage in a dialogue with 
the indigenous peoples involved in the cases it is reviewing, and that anthropologists 
have been chosen as cultural translators in this enterprise. It can be useful to cite the 
Court’s deliberations on this matter, taken from a case dealing with the conflict between 
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the right of indigenous peoples to cultural integrity and the individual human right of 
religious freedom: 
(…) the Court considers that in cases where it is indispensable to weigh 
the importance of the right to ethnic and cultural difference against some 
other value, principle or constitutional right, it is necessary to enter into a 
kind of dialogue – direct or indirect- between the constitutional judge and 
the community or communities whose ethnic and cultural identity could 
be affected by the Court’s sentence. The function of said activity pursues 
the widening of the judge’s own cultural reality and of the constitutional 
horizon upon which the decision to be taken must be based, to include the 
ethos and the cosmovision of the human group or groups that claim their 
right to ethnic and cultural difference. In the Court’s opinion, only 
through such a fusion can it be possible to reach a constitutional decision 
that truly recognizes and respects cultural difference and the idea of 
justice established in the Constitution (Preamble and article 1).115  
 
In the case of territorial rights, their inherent connection to both the physical survival 
and the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples makes them impossible to discuss 
without trying to comprehend how these peoples understand the concept of territory. 
The Court has in many cases made use of anthropological ethnography to help explain 
this, such as in the recent case SU-383/03 of 2003, concerning ill effects of aerial 
fumigation of coca crops in the Colombian Amazon. This vast area, which makes up 
about a third of the national territory, is inhabited by around eighty different indigenous 
peoples,116 many of which are nomadic and/or have segments of their population living 
beyond the Colombian border.117 As part of Plan Colombia, the massive program 
funded by the USA to combat drug production and the armed insurgency, fields planted 
with coca and poppy have been sprayed from the air with glyphosate. Glyphosate is a 
chemical product around which there is a lot of controversy, as critics claim it is highly 
toxic and harmful both to the environment and to human beings, while proponents hold 
that it is a safe and efficient tool of drug eradication. The inaccuracy of aerial spraying 
has caused the glyphosate to affect much more than the coca fields of the drug 
traffickers. It has destroyed vegetation surrounding the coca crops, both food crops and 
natural rain forest, and in addition the chemicals have been spread by wind and water to 
areas far from the coca fields. Add to that the fact that coca is a sacred plant to many 
indigenous peoples, widely used in ceremonial acts and imbued with strong religious 
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meaning. This is recognized by domestic legislation, and the practice of indigenous 
peoples of keeping small crops of coca is legally accepted. The plant is grown 
interspersed with other food crops, and aerial photos don’t always permit distinguishing 
between indigenous and commercial coca crops. As a result many cultivation areas and 
even settlements of indigenous peoples were sprayed with glyphosate, leading to an 
outbreak of skin diseases and other health problems, including several unexplained 
deaths. In response to this, the NGO OPIACO (Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas 
de la Amazonía Colombiana) presented a tutela to seek the protection of a number of 
fundamental rights, demanding that the fumigations should be suspended. The tutela 
was rejected in lower instance courts, and the Constitutional Court chose the case for 
review. It concluded that the state authorities had violated the right to participation of 
the indigenous peoples of the Amazon, which is instrumental in protecting the right to 
cultural, social and economic integrity of indigenous peoples.118  
The Court’s treatment of the case involved a thorough investigation of the meaning of 
territory and natural resources to indigenous peoples of the Amazon region.  
Referencing anthropological texts on this issue, the Court established that the concept of 
territories of indigenous peoples differs from that of majority society. Territory cannot 
be reduced to a question of occupation of a geographical area, or of appropriation of the 
forest and other natural resources. Rather, territory belongs as much to the realm of 
culture as to that of geography. The management of the natural environment is 
inextricably linked to social relations, and neither can be understood without reference 
to the symbolic aspects with which they are associated.119 In exploring this issue the 
Court cited several anthropologists, one of whom provided the following attempt to 
define the meaning of territory in indigenous cultures of the Amazon:  
We find that territory is both a space and a process leading to the creation 
of a word of Law, understood as guidance, education. That space is not 
necessarily geographical, characterized by rocky outcrops, hills, streams 
or wells. Rather, that space is memory; it is the writing of the on-going 
process of creation; in the upbringing of the children, in social relations, 
in the solution of problems, in the healing of sickness.120
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In Sentence C-891 of 2002, investigating the constitutionality of a number of articles of 
the new Mining Code,121 the Court refers to a report by the Humboldt Institute on the 
subject of traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples. The report argues that the 
special relationship of indigenous peoples to their land is born from a comprehensive 
conception of the world which places human beings and the natural environment around 
them in the same dimension. In the view of the Humboldt Institute, the “cosmovision” 
of indigenous peoples, meaning their perception and understanding of the universe in all 
its material and spiritual aspects, is highly symbolized. Indigenous cultures often 
“socialize nature and naturalize social life”,122 meaning that phenomena in nature are 
explained by reference to social categories and vice versa. The relationship between 
indigenous peoples and the natural resources in their territories cannot be reduced to a 
simple relation of subject and object, it is impossible to separate a natural resource, such 
as a particular plant or mineral, from the symbolic position of that resource in the 
cosmovision of the people. These conceptions are expressed through mythology, 
religious beliefs and practices, and systems of internal regulation, including 
management of the environment, systems of production and exchange, and systems for 
preventing disease.123 Or in the words of the Humboldt Institute: “Territories and 
resources, as well as traditional knowledge, form a legacy which unites as a whole the 
past, present and future generations of indigenous peoples.”124
3.3.2 The Awas Tingni case: Anthropology in international jurisprudence  
In the afore-mentioned case C-891/02, the Court leaned on international jurisprudence 
to show how the special relationship of indigenous peoples with their territories is 
becoming accepted in international law.  
In 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the Inter-American 
Court) passed judgment in the case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua (Hereinafter the Awas Tingni case).125 The Inter-American Court found that 
Nicaragua violated international law by failing to recognize and protect the traditional 
land tenure of the indigenous community of Awas Tingni, granting instead a concession 
to a Korean transnational corporation for large-scale logging on the ancestral lands of 
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the community.126 This is a landmark case in international law, as the first legally 
binding decision of an international court to protect indigenous peoples’ collective 
property right to their lands and natural resources.  
The current United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, the 
anthropologist and sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, participated in the proceedings as 
an independent expert. Questioned about the relationship of indigenous peoples to land, 
Stavenhagen stated the following:  
All anthropological, ethnological studies, all the documentation that 
indigenous populations themselves in recent years have had the 
opportunity to present to the public opinion, all the reports that 
governmental experts and international experts of different types of 
multilateral organizations (sic) show one fundamental thing: that the bond 
between indigenous peoples and the land is an essential bond that gives 
and maintains the cultural identity of these peoples. And here one must 
understand the land to mean not a simple instrument of agricultural or 
other production, not the land as a factor in production as economists tell 
us, but rather, the land as a part of the geographic space and the social 
space, of the symbolic space, of the religious space with which the history 
of indigenous peoples is connected and with which the current 
functioning of those same peoples is connected. […] Also, the indigenous 
organizations themselves and the declarations of indigenous movements 
always tell us that the land does not belong to us, but rather, that we 
belong to the land. The bond is fundamental in that the fertility of the 
land, the fertility of the people, the physical health, the mental health, the 
social health of the indigenous peoples is connected with the concept of 
the land.127
After citing these words of Stavenhagen, the Constitutional Court went on to cite the 
judgment of the Inter-American Court, which clearly endorsed Stavenhagen’s and other 
consulted anthropologists’ views on the importance of territory for indigenous peoples: 
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to 
live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous people with 
the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis for 
their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic 
survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely 
a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element 
which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and 
transmit it to future generations. 128
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The Inter-American Court found a violation of articles 21 (right to property) and 25 
(right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). 
The Court argued further that:  
International human rights treaties are live instruments whose 
interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, to 
current living conditions.129 (…) Read in conjunction with article 1(1) of 
the ACHR, which prohibits discrimination of any kind in the enjoyment 
and exercise of the rights of the Convention, an evolutionary 
interpretation of the right to property as included in article 21 must 
include the concept of collective property as practiced and understood by 
indigenous peoples.130
The Constitutional Court of Colombia had long employed a similar reading of the 
content of the collective right to land of indigenous peoples, recognized both by the 
Constitution and ILO Convention No. 169, article 14.1: 
The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the 
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized. In addition, 
measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the 
peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to 
which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and 
traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of 
the nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect.131
In the Awas Tingni case, the judges of the Constitutional Court of Colombia found 
support for its interpretation of indigenous peoples’ rights from such an important 
authority of international law as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In fact, the 
effort made by the Inter-American Court to make sense of international human rights 
law in the frame of reference of indigenous peoples is similar  to the one made by the 
Constitutional Court. Both courts have based their interpretations on anthropological 
literature and testimony of indigenous representatives in order to comprehend the 
meaning of territory to indigenous peoples. The main difference lies in the legal sources 
the courts have used to establish the right of indigenous peoples to collective property 
of lands and territories.  
Interestingly enough, it seems that the Constitutional Court of Colombia has had 
stronger legal backing than the Inter-American Court when it comes to adjudicating 
indigenous peoples’ rights. Whereas the Inter-American Court based its judgment in the 
Awas Tingni case solely on the ACHR and its own jurisprudence,132 the Constitutional 
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Court finds its sources in the constitutional corpus encompassing the Constitution, all 
international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia and the jurisprudence of 
relevant international human rights courts and treaty bodies. In the majority of cases, the 
Constitutional Court refers only to ILO Convention No. 169 in addition to the 
Constitution itself, as this is the most relevant of the international human rights treaties 
and the one which spells out the content of indigenous peoples’ rights in the clearest 
manner. However, if the Court should wish to include more legal sources in its 
reasoning on the land rights of indigenous peoples, both the ACHR and the Inter-
American Court’s judgment in the Awas Tingni case is part of the constitutional corpus. 
That is also the case with the ICCPR, which the Court referred to in Sentence C-891/02 
directly after citing the Awas Tingni case. The Court held that the opinions set forth by 
Stavenhagen and the judges of the Inter-American Court clearly showed that the right of 
indigenous peoples to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their religion and 
to use their own language, as stated in article 27 of ICCPR, must be understood as 
including the right to possess their own territory, on which these peoples may preserve 
their cultural heritage and transmit it to future generations.133
3.4 Fundamental rights connected to lands and natural resources  
The investigation into the meaning of territory provides an example of how the 
Constitutional Court has made use of anthropological research to better understand the 
concepts, cultural practices and fundamental needs of indigenous peoples. Beyond the 
hermeneutic exercise of building inter-cultural comprehension, the challenge for the 
Court has been to link these special needs and conditions of indigenous peoples to rights 
set down in the Constitution and the relevant international human rights treaties. With 
respect to the importance of lands and natural resources to indigenous peoples, the 
Court has pursued two interconnected lines of argument: On the one hand, territories of 
indigenous peoples are fundamentally important for protecting these peoples’ right to 
cultural, social and economic integrity. On the other, territories form the material basis 
for the survival of indigenous peoples, both as individuals and groups. These two issues 
are, because of their very nature, difficult to separate and throughout the Court’s 
jurisprudence they appear as inherently interrelated. In the following I will nevertheless 
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make an attempt to treat them separately in order to highlight the different legal 
consequences that may be derived from them.  
3.4.1 The right to cultural, social and economic integrity 
Article 330 of the Constitution declares that exploitation of natural resources in 
indigenous territories shall be carried out without harm to the cultural, social and 
economic integrity of indigenous communities.134 The Constitution doesn’t define such 
integrity, but the Constitutional Court, in case SU-039/97, stated that natural resource 
extraction in indigenous territories involves a conflict of interests between the economic 
development of the country and the protection of the cultural, social and economic 
integrity of indigenous peoples, which it defined as: “the basic elements that constitute 
their cohesion as a social group and which, therefore, form the substrate of their 
subsistence.”135  
The Court has made it clear that this concept is connected to the State duty to respect 
and protect cultural diversity, as stated in article 7 of the Constitution.136 References 
from international human rights law are also helpful to understanding the concept. 
Article 27 of ICCPR protects the right of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their religion and to use their own 
language, in community with other members of their group.137  
ILO Convention 169 declares that signatory States have the duty to promote the full 
realization of the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous peoples with respect 
for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their 
institutions.138 Further, that the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and 
practices of these peoples shall be recognized and protected, with due account to the 
nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals. Finally, that 
the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be 
respected.139 Together, these articles support an interpretation of cultural, social and 
economic integrity as related to questions of identity and cultural diversity. Indigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain and develop their distinct identity, and this identity is 
exercised through their cosmovision, customs, religious beliefs, languages, political and 
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social organization, economic practices, in short; their entire way of life. States are 
obliged to recognize and protect this diversity of cultures, and to take special measures 
to secure indigenous peoples equal enjoyment of rights with the rest of the 
population.140 This is echoed in more general terms in the Constitution of Colombia, 
which prohibits any form of discrimination and declares that the State has a special duty 
to make this equality of rights effective, taking special measures to protect marginalized 
groups.141 This requires implementing mechanisms and instruments which are 
appropriate to the cultural, social and economic characteristics of indigenous peoples, 
while at the same time being compatible with the political and legal organization of the 
State. The recognition of indigenous peoples’ strong emphasis on the collective aspects 
of life and the importance of the community, and taking measures to guarantee the 
viability of this form of life is a first step to protecting their cultural, social and 
economic integrity.  
In Colombia, collective land tenure is a central mechanism of protection, as it is meant 
to secure indigenous peoples the possibility of maintaining their traditional form of life 
and the economic practices which ensure their subsistence.  
The Constitutional Court has commented on the difference of economic models of 
indigenous peoples and the majority society, with relation to the use of natural 
resources. In the aforementioned case T-380/93, the Court declared that the relationship 
of the economic system of capitalism to the natural environment is one of domination 
and exploitation, which results in great tension between the search for profit and the 
need for sustainable management of natural resources.142 Indigenous peoples often 
depend on fragile ecosystems for their survival, and their economic practices reflect this 
need for a balanced and sustainable harvesting of natural resources. Indiscriminate 
exploitation destroys the primary resources necessary for the economy of subsistence 
which many indigenous peoples engage in, especially in tropical lowland regions, and 
which is symbolically connected to all aspects of their life.143  
The Constitutional Court argued that the constitutional principle of cultural diversity 
demands the recognition and protection of different economic models, including the 
subsistence economy of indigenous peoples. Since this type of economy is extremely 
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vulnerable to activities that damage the equilibrium of the ecosystems it depends on, the 
Constitution establishes a limit to natural resource extraction on indigenous territories: it 
mustn’t in any way harm their cultural, social and economic integrity.144   
3.4.2  The collective right to life and the freedom from forced disappearance 
The Constitutional Court stated in case T-380/93 that among the fundamental rights of 
indigenous peoples is the right to subsistence, derived directly from the right to life as 
consecrated in article 11 of the Constitution.145 Having established that destroying the 
natural environment within which indigenous peoples carry out their economic practices 
is a violation of their cultural, social and economic integrity, as it makes impossible the 
continued exercise of their group identity, the Court stated the following: 
The cultures of indigenous peoples correspond to a way of life that 
materializes in a special mode of being and acting in the world, 
constituted of values, beliefs, attitudes and knowledge. If this mode of 
being should be eliminated or suppressed, as could be the result of severe 
degradation of their environment, it would lead to destabilization and the 
eventual extinction of their entire way of life. The prohibition of all forms 
of forced disappearance (Constitution article 12) is also applicable to the 
indigenous communities, who have the fundamental right to ethnic, 
cultural and social integrity.146
Keeping in mind that case T-380/93 dealt with a case of large-scale illegal logging on 
indigenous land, the public authority whose legal responsibility it was to protect the 
natural resources and guarantee the reparation of any ecological damage, 
CODECHOCÓ, was condemned for grave negligence in its duty. The Court argued that 
CODECHOCÓ’s omission of its duty amounted to a serious threat to the right to life 
and the freedom from forced disappearance of the Embera-Katío community of 
Chajeradó: 
The close relation between a balanced ecosystem and the survival of the 
indigenous communities that inhabit the tropical rain forests transforms 
the factors of environmental damage caused by deforestation, 
sedimentation and the contamination of rivers – in principle cases of 
violation of collective rights and interests and therefore meant to be 
addressed through the exercise of acción popular – and turns them into a 
potential danger to the life and the cultural, social and economic integrity 
of minority groups that, given their ethnic and cultural diversity, have the 
right to special protection from the State (Constitution art. 13). The 
State’s inaction in the face of serious damage to the environment of an 
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ethnic group may, given the biological interdependence of the ecosystem, 
contribute passively to the perpetration of an ethnocide, consisting in the 
forced disappearance of an ethnic group (Constitution art. 12) as a result 
of the destruction of their conditions of life and their system of beliefs.147   
These are dramatic affirmations of the Court. Two terms are introduced which are not 
often brought into play with relation to environmental destruction: ethnocide and forced 
disappearance. In order to comprehend the potential consequences of the Court’s 
finding, it will be necessary to investigate the possible interpretations of those terms in 
international human rights law and to see whether such interpretations are applicable in 
this case. We must study attempts to define the crimes of ethnocide and forced 
disappearance, and establish their status in international human rights law. Then we will 
see whether the Constitutional Court bases its ruling on accepted international doctrine, 
or if it goes beyond mainstream doctrine and creates a more robust defence of 
indigenous peoples’ rights.  
3.4.2.1 Ethnocide 
The term “ethnocide” does not appear in any international human rights treaty currently 
in force; but has rather been considered by legal scholars as a sub-type of “genocide”. 
However, the concept has been used and developed by social scientists when referring 
to actions of majority groups that have such devastating effects on minority cultures that 
they drive them to extinction.148 In order to compare the two terms, it is necessary to 
first establish the meaning of the term “genocide” and then investigate whether 
“ethnocide” offers any added value. I will first outline the main elements of the 
interpretation of “genocide” as it appears in international law, and discuss whether this 
interpretation is applicable to the situation of the Embera-Katío people of case T-
380/93. I shall then comment on the meaning given to “ethnocide” in the Draft United 
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Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, and its relation to the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of the term.  
According to Smith, the word “genocide” is a modern term for an ancient crime,149 and 
includes both the physical and the cultural extermination of a group. History is full of 
examples. Indigenous peoples in the Americas were decimated in the centuries 
following the European invasion of their continent. Diseases, slavery and outright 
slaughter of men, women and children were common elements in the subjugation of the 
native inhabitants of the so-called New World.150 But the term “genocide” was coined 
later, to describe the systematic mass-murder of Jews during World War II.   
The first legal definition of the term appeared in 1946 in General Assembly Resolution 
no. 96 (I): “Genocide is the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups”.151 
The existence of a discernible group is essential, but the characteristics of the group 
may vary. The definition of genocide which is most widely accepted and considered 
authoritative is the one adopted by the United Nations in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (hereinafter “the Genocide 
Convention”). Article 2 reads as follows:  
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the 
group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group, e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.152
The group element is very clear in this definition and several different groups are listed, 
one of them being “ethnical”. A straightforward interpretation of “ethnocide” would be 
that it is a specification of what kind of group is being attacked, and as such it may 
sometimes provide for greater clarity of argument but is in reality quite superfluous as a 
legal term. Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International criminal Court adopts the 
same definition word for word.153 Genocide is now widely accepted as a peremptory 
norm of international law, a prime example of jus cogens.154  
 
149  Smith (2003) p. 213 
150  Anaya (2004) p. 3 
151  General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) (1946). Cited by Smith (2003) p. 214 
152  Genocide Convention (1948) art. II 
153  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
154  Smith (2003) p. 216 
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The essence of genocide lies not in the actual destruction of a group but in the intent to 
destroy it as such, in other words the mens rea of the crime.155 To determine whether 
destruction of an indigenous people’s natural habitat and basis for subsistence could 
amount to genocide, the critical element is whether the action of environmental 
destruction was carried out with the intent to extinguish the group living there.  
In the case of industrial logging on the land of the Embera-Katío people of 
Chajeradó,156 the actual perpetrator was a private logging company, motivated by profit 
and probably indifferent to the fate of the Embera-Katíos. The Constitutional Court 
found that it was the failure of the State to protect the Embera-Katíos that could 
passively lead to ethnocide, given the indigenous community’s dependence on the 
natural environment for its subsistence. The actual damage caused would be grave 
enough to fulfil the requirement of paragraph c) of article 2 of the Genocide 
Convention, of inflicting conditions of life that could bring about the destruction of the 
group. But the Court did not find genocidal intent on the part of the State authority, only 
negligence of its duty to protect and to repair the environmental damages.  
Mens rea, the “intent to destroy”, is extremely difficult to prove, making it very unlikely 
that arguments of genocide can prosper in cases of destruction caused by natural 
resource exploitation or development projects on the lands of indigenous peoples. This 
is unsatisfactory from a moral point of view, as one cannot help asking what difference 
mens rea makes to the victims. If their entire culture is annihilated, would it be any less 
serious if it is due to a side-effect of economic development rather than an openly 
declared ethnic hatred? Indifference to the plight of indigenous peoples as their cultures 
are destroyed for economic profit is just as contrary to the spirit of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a hateful intent to exterminate them. This complete 
disregard for the inherent human dignity of indigenous peoples and the cultural wealth 
of which they are custodians brings to mind the famous words of Elie Wiesel: “The 
opposite of love is not hate, it is indifference”. 
During the past few decades a more rights-based approach to the question of protection 
of indigenous cultures has progressed. This has been especially obvious in the activities 
of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS), which are both 
 
155  Roos (2002) p. 2 
156  Sentence T-380/93 
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trying to create declarations on the rights of indigenous peoples.157 An explicit 
reference to ethnocide appears in article 7 of the Draft United Nations Declaration:  
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be 
subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide, including prevention of and 
redress for: a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them 
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic 
identities; b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing 
them of their lands, territories or resources; c) Any form of population 
transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of 
their rights; d) Any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures 
or ways of life imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other 
measures; e) Any form of propaganda directed against them.158
This definition is very different from the standard definition of “genocide”, although 
there is direct reference to “cultural genocide”. The problem of intent is solved by 
introducing the words “aim or effect”. That alone would strengthen the protection of 
indigenous peoples immensely. A second difference is that there is no reference to 
physical destruction of the group. Instead, the emphasis is on the importance of the 
distinct cultures of indigenous peoples, and on the assertion that their continued 
existence as groups depends on their right to exercise their distinct identity.  
The list of actions is made up of examples of attacks against the cultural integrity of 
indigenous peoples, and is both concrete yet wide enough to cover possible new forms 
of aggression. This definition is much better suited to cover the wide range of ways in 
which indigenous peoples are being forced or pressured to abandon their distinct 
identity and assimilate into the prevailing society.  
The explicit reference to lands and territories of indigenous peoples is another example 
of how the importance of territory is becoming increasingly understood internationally, 
and how almost every aspect of the struggle for indigenous peoples’ rights relates to the 
question of territory. 
It is likely that the Constitutional Court’s use of “ethnocide” in case T-380/93 resembles 
the Draft Declaration’s interpretation of the term,159 which emphasizes the importance 
of self-determination and cultural integrity. However, it might be argued that the Court 
takes it a step further by making explicit reference to the right to life and the freedom 
 
157  Although neither the 1994 Draft United Nations Declaration nor the 1997 OAS Declaration 
Project have yet been concluded due to disagreements on key points, the draft texts are still important 
indications of the direction in which international law on indigenous peoples’ rights is heading. 
158  Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1994), art. 7 
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from forced disappearance. Taking into account the Court’s case law on cultural, social 
and economic integrity, the importance of the community, the right to special protection 
of disadvantaged groups, the nexus of indigenous peoples to the environment and its 
effects on their right to life, it is evident that the Court links cultural and physical 
destruction. If an indigenous community is deprived of the necessary conditions for its 
continued existence as a distinct, cultural group, it amounts to a violation of its right to 
life and freedom from forced disappearance.  
In case T-380/93, even if no member of the Embera-Katío community should die, the 
destruction of the community’s living environment would be an ethnocide if it led to the 
disintegration of the community as such. The central point is that it is the right to life of 
the community which is violated, not necessarily that of its individual members.  
3.4.2.2 Forced Disappearance 
The crime of forced disappearance became notorious during the dictatorships of Central 
and South America in the 1970s and 80s. It was first defined in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 1992, and 
applies to the case of persons being detained or abducted by government officials or 
with the acquiescence of these, followed by a refusal of the authorities to acknowledge 
the detention and disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person.160 The practice of 
forced disappearance has been wide-spread in Colombia for the past decades, in the 
context of the on-going internal, armed conflict. Article 12 of the Constitution expressly 
prohibits the practice, but doesn’t provide a definition. It wasn’t until 2000 that 
Colombia enacted a penal law defining the crimes of forced disappearance, genocide, 
forced displacement and torture.161 The adopted definition of forced disappearance 
includes all the elements of the definition of the United Nations Declaration.162 In 2005 
Colombia acceded to the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of 
Persons, which employs a similar definition.163 The Constitutional Court does not make 
reference to any definition of forced disappearance in case T-380/93, only to the 
 
159  I say “likely”, because the Court has never explicitly referred to this definition or any other. It is 
worth noting that Sentence T-380/93 appeared the year before the publication of the Draft United Nations 
Declaration. 
160  Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992), Preamble 
161  Law 589 (2000) 
162  Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances - Mission to Colombia 
(2006) p. 10 
163  Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994) art. II 
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constitutional prohibition of the practice. None of the elements of the definition from 
the United Nations Declaration apply in case T-380/93, yet as at the time there didn’t 
exist any definition of the practice either in the laws of the country or the constitutional 
corpus, the Court was free to interpret the Constitution’s reference to forced 
disappearance as it saw fit.164 In declaring that the freedom from forced disappearance 
also applies to indigenous communities,165 the Court chose to employ a straightforward 
interpretation based on the facts of the case: An entire indigenous community was in 
danger of disintegrating and ceasing to exist due to actions by a private actor which 
were seemingly tolerated by State authorities. The community, in itself a collective 
subject of fundamental rights, was threatened with forced disappearance, despite no 
individual member of the community being “disappeared”.  
3.4.2.3 Concluding remarks on ethnocide and forced disappearance 
Taking into account the Court’s view on the importance of the community to indigenous 
peoples and the unequivocal opinion that indigenous communities are holders of 
fundamental rights, the references in case T-380/93 to the right to life (from which the 
right to subsistence is derived) and the freedom from forced disappearance indicate that 
the Court considers the effects of an action as more important than its ultimate aim. 
While the “specific intent” requirement of genocide makes it very difficult to prove, the 
Court’s use of the term “ethnocide” avoids such snags. In the Court’s interpretation, 
“ethnocide” seems to mean physical and/or cultural destruction of a human group, 
materialized through the forced disappearance of that group. In this way the 
Constitutional Court keeps in mind the object and purpose of the human rights to life 
and cultural integrity, and thus avoids the moral dilemma of having to absolve a guilty 
party of ethnocide just because specific intent can’t be proved. As such the Court sets a 
positive example by not limiting itself to restrictive analysis of legal text.  
Although the Constitutional Court has not always been entirely consistent in its 
jurisprudence,166 the fact that case T-380/93 is so often cited by the Court is an 
indication that its conclusions in that case are still considered valid.167 Of special note is 
the previously discussed case T-652/98, in which the Court expressly applied its rulings 
 
164  It is possible, however unlikely, that the Court magistrates did not know the content of the 
Declaration on Enforced Disappearance, which was published some nine months prior to Sentence T-
380/93. In any case, there is no reference to it in said sentence.  
165  Sentence T-380/93, section II.8. See chapter 3.4.2, supra 
166  See note 147, supra  
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from case T-380/93 to the facts of the case and elaborated on them in detail.168 In its 
analysis the Court undertook a thorough investigation of how the economic practices of 
the indigenous communities in question were affected as a consequence of their territory 
being flooded. It concluded that the impossibility of continuing their traditional 
economic practices entailed a grave threat to the cultural, social and economic integrity 
of the communities, as well as to their right to subsistence and thus life.169
3.5 The right to consultation and participation 
In one of the most famous cases of the Constitutional Court to date, SU-039/97, the 
Court defined the aim and scope of the right to prior consultation in cases of natural 
resource extraction. The case dealt with a complaint raised by the Ombudsman’s office 
on behalf of the U’wa people, whose ancestral lands are located in western Colombia. 
The area is rich in oil, and in 1995 the Ministry of Environment granted a license to the 
Occidental Petroleum Company (OXY) for seismic explorations in an area including the 
resguardo of the U’wa. The U’wa communities protested fiercely and captured the 
attention of international society when they threatened to commit collective suicide if 
their ancestral lands were violated by the petroleum company.170 In order to establish 
whether the Ministry of Environment and OXY had fulfilled or not their constitutional 
obligation to carry out a process of prior consultation with the U’was, the Constitutional 
Court analyzed the scope and content of the right in question as it appears in the 
constitutional corpus.  Reiterating that the right of indigenous peoples to cultural, social 
and economic integrity is a fundamental right because of its connection to their 
subsistence as human groups, the Court declared that according to article 330 of the 
Constitution this subsistence shall be protected through the participation of the 
indigenous communities in decisions concerning natural resource extraction in their 
territories.171 The right to participation is set down in article 40.2 of the Constitution. In 
the case of indigenous peoples, the Court found that the right to participation, by way of 
 
167  See i.e. Sentence SU-039/97; Sentence T-652/98; Sentence SU-383/03  
168  Case T-652/98 dealt with a dam being built on the territory of the Embera-Katío people of Alto 
Sinú. See chapter 3.2 supra, and chapter 4.1.1 infra 
169  Sentence T-652/98, section 5 a) 
170  The case has been widely covered both by activist networks and academic writers. For the 
former, see i.e. Colombia: Ecopetrol's Siriri Oil Project.  
For the latter, see i.e. Culler (2001), Wagner (2001) and especially Rodríguez-Garavito (2005). 
171  Sentence SU-039/97, section II.3.2 
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the mechanism of prior consultation, acquires the status of fundamental right because it 
is instrumental to preserving their cultural, social and economic integrity.  
This fundamental right to participation is reinforced by ILO Convention 169, which 
gives great attention to the question of participation.172 The Court cited articles 5, 6, 7.1 
and 15 of the ILO Convention as authoritative sources for the interpretation of the right 
to participation in Colombian law. Article 5 demands the protection of the social, 
cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of indigenous peoples and the 
respect of their integrity. Article 7.1 approaches the thorny subject of self-
determination, recognizing indigenous peoples’ right to “decide their own priorities for 
the process of development” and “to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their 
own economic, social and cultural development”. Articles 6 and 15 require that States 
consult with indigenous peoples and ensure their informed participation when 
considering administrative and legislative measures that will affect them directly, 
especially with regard to the use, management and conservation of the natural resources 
in their territories. Article 6 sets down the general principle that consultation must be 
carried out in good faith, in a form appropriate to the circumstances and with the 
objective of achieving consent. Basing itself on these articles, the Court argued that a 
process of consultation with an indigenous community requires a relation of 
communication and understanding between the community and the authorities, 
characterized by mutual respect and good faith.173 The Court proposed a check-list of 
three elements which must be present for a valid consultation process to have taken 
place: 
a) That the community obtains full knowledge of the projects that aim to 
explore or exploit the natural resources in the territories that they use or 
that belong to them, as well as the mechanisms, procedures and activities 
necessary for their implementation; 
b) That the community understands and is conscious of how the 
implementation of the projects in question could lead to negative effects 
on the elements that compose the basis for their social, cultural, economic 
and political cohesion and, consequently, the foundation for their 
subsistence as a human group with singular characteristics; 
c) That the community is given the opportunity to freely and without 
external interference, through the meeting of its members or 
representatives, conscientiously evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of the project to the community and its members. The point 
 
172  ibid. section II.3.3 
173  ibid. 
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of view of the community in relation to the viability of the project and the 
defence of their rights should be heard. The aim of the process should be 
that the indigenous community should enjoy an active and effective 
participation in the decision-making process, and that the decision finally 
taken by the authority should, to the extent possible, be agreed upon with 
the indigenous community.174
From this analysis it follows that merely informing an indigenous community of plans 
to explore the natural resources in its territory, as happened in the U’wa case, is far from 
conforming to the requirements of a proper consultation process.175 The fundamental 
importance of the right to participation demands that a consultation process be serious 
and carried out in good faith, and that the indigenous community gets the chance to 
contemplate the consequences and express their approval or rejection of the project. 
This implies that the information must be presented in a language and manner which the 
members of the indigenous community can understand, especially important when 
considering the high level of illiteracy of many isolated indigenous peoples. Another 
implication is that time limits must be sufficiently ample to allow information to reach 
all members of an affected community, taking into account the settlement patterns of 
indigenous peoples, often inhabiting remote areas of difficult access. In cases where no 
agreement is reached despite a good faith effort fulfilling the requirements set down in 
the check-list, it is the opinion of the Court that the public authority has the final 
responsibility to make a decision. Such a decision must, however, be objective, 
reasonable and proportionate to the constitutional end of protecting the social, cultural 
and economic integrity of the indigenous community.176  
The Court returns to the point of final disagreement in case C-891/02, where it cites 
ILO guidelines for application of Convention 169: “Like other elements of the national 
population of any country, indigenous and tribal peoples do not have the right to veto 
development plans that may affect the whole country.”177 The subject of veto is a 
continuing point of contention, as indigenous representatives have complained that the 
lack of veto power will reduce consultation to a mere formality, leaving governments to 
do what they want anyway. However, the ILO guidelines explain that states have the 
duty to ensure actual consultation with indigenous peoples, including giving the 
indigenous communities a real opportunity to influence decisions, and providing an 
 
174  ibid. (My translation) 
175  ibid. 
176  ibid. 
177  Tomei (1996) section 1. Cited in Sentence C-891/02, section VI.4.2, para. 17 
  47 
                                                
enabling environment and conditions to permit the meaningful participation of these 
peoples.178  
Other international sources declare that indigenous peoples have a right to “free, prior 
and informed consent”, not merely that consultations should have the aim of achieving 
consent. CERD General Recommendation 23 on indigenous peoples, published the 
same year as case SU-039/97, calls upon States to “ensure that members of indigenous 
peoples have rights in respect of effective participation of public life and that no 
decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed 
consent.”179 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly 
emphasized the need to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples in relation to resource 
exploitation.180 The Awas Tingni case of the Inter-American Court and several reports 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also highlight the link between 
consultation resulting in full and informed consent, and protection of indigenous 
property rights.181 On the other hand, the World Bank Group rejects adopting free, prior 
and informed consent as operational policy, “where this would represent a veto on 
development”.182 The Constitutional Court looks only to the ILO Convention in this 
matter, and does not require that indigenous peoples give their consent in a given case, 
as long as the consultation process has been adequate according to the check-list 
outlined above. However, if the Colombian State should authorize a project against the 
express wishes of the affected indigenous community, the decision to do so must fulfil 
the requirements of being objective, reasonable and proportionate, as well as not in any 
way endangering the fundamental rights of the indigenous community to subsistence 
and cultural integrity.  
The “participation check-list” is a useful tool for evaluating the adequacy of 
consultation processes, and it has been invoked in several cases where the authorities 
and indigenous communities dispute whether such processes have been properly carried 
out. Such was the case in sentence C-169/01 of 2001, a review of the constitutionality of 
a new law regulating the special participation of minority ethnic groups in Congress. 
The NGO ONIC protested that the enactment of the new law was unconstitutional in 
procedure as indigenous organizations had not been consulted on its content. The Court 
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in this case applied an uncharacteristically restrictive interpretation, holding that the 
state duty to consult indigenous peoples only applied for cases of natural resource 
extraction. The Court reasoned that as there is no explicit reference to consultation 
rights either in the Constitution or the laws except for the Constitution’s article 330 on 
natural resources, the right to consultation does not cover legislative or other non-
specified measures even though they affect indigenous peoples directly. The decision is 
curious as this interpretation of consultation rights is not only restrictive, but appears to 
be in direct contradiction of article 6 of the ILO Convention and its explicit reference to 
“legislative and administrative measures”. The Court recognized its obligation under 
article 6, but then referred to article 34 of the same Convention to give the State a 
margin of discretion:183  
The nature and scope of the measures to be taken to give effect to this 
Convention shall be determined in a flexible manner, having regard to the 
conditions characteristic of each country.184
The Court’s conclusion was that as long as the effective participation of indigenous 
peoples in law-making is guaranteed by the presence of indigenous representatives in 
Congress, there is no obligation to carry out a special consultation process. However, 
the Court warned that any misuse of article 34 of the ILO Convention could lead to a 
violation of article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties185, stating that 
treaties must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of 
the terms employed and in light of their object and purpose.186 Despite this finding, in 
the more recent case C-891/02 of 2002 the Court did see fit to evaluate the 
characteristics of the consultation process that was carried out in relation with the 
creation of the new Mining Code, by definition a legislative measure.187 As previously 
mentioned, the Court found in case SU-383/03 that the right to participation had been 
violated with relation to the program of aerial glyphosate spraying of coca crops in the 
Amazon region.188  In that case the Court clarified that the right to participation is not 
restricted to situations of natural resource extraction, but is valid for all measures 
directly affecting indigenous peoples, in accordance with article 6 of the ILO 
 
183  Sentence C-169/01, section V.2.3 
184  ILO Convention 169 (1989) art. 34 
185  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) art. 31.1 
186  Sentence C-169/01, section V.2.3 
187  Botero (2004), p. 370 
188  See pp. 29-30, supra 
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Convention.189 Because of the special importance of the coca plant in the indigenous 
cultures of the Amazon region and the interconnectedness of indigenous peoples with 
their natural environment, a consultation process including the appropriate form of 
implementation of the drug eradication programme was in the Court’s opinion the only 
way of guaranteeing their fundamental right to cultural, social and economic integrity. 
In this case, the Court didn’t find the margin of discretion of article 34 of the ILO 
Convention to exempt the authorities from carrying out a direct consultation process 
with the affected peoples. 
3.5.1 Concluding remarks on the right to consultation 
In synthesis it can be said that the Constitutional Court upholds the requirements of the 
ILO Convention, and has contributed to concretizing the content of the Convention in 
the Colombian context, by clearly defining the aim and scope of the right to 
participation. It is not surprising, given the current state of international law and 
especially the legal instruments included in the constitutional corpus, that the Court 
doesn’t acknowledge a right to free, prior and informed consent to the degree that it 
could entail a veto right. The Court’s opinion that State decisions regarding measures 
affecting indigenous peoples must first fulfil the consultation check-list and in any case 
not violate any of these peoples’ fundamental rights, should in principle be a 
sufficiently strong guarantee for their protection, even in cases where consent isn’t 
given. However, it is important to question who will be given the responsibility of 
determining whether indigenous peoples’ rights will be violated or not by a given 
project, if the opinion of the affected communities is not followed? Although the Court 
has done an impressive job in interpreting indigenous peoples’ rights with the aid of 
anthropologists, it seems logical that in order to achieve the ideal of self-determination, 
indigenous peoples themselves must be recognized as fully capable of deciding whether 
and in what way projects affecting their lands and resources shall be carried out. Only 
through recognition of the right to free, prior and informed consent may the right of 
indigenous peoples to “decide their own priorities for the process of development”,190 
and to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”191 be fulfilled in 
a satisfactory manner. Given the Constitutional Court’s generally progressive 
 
189  Sentence SU-383/03, section II.6.1, Botero (2004) p. 381 
190  ILO Convention 169 (1989) art. 7.1 
191  ICCPR (1966) and ICESCR (1966) art. 1 
  50 
interpretation of the constitutional corpus, there is hope that the growing acceptance of 
the importance of free, prior and informed consent in international law will lead to an 
evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence on this point. 
3.6 Concluding remarks on the Constitutional Court’s development of 
indigenous peoples’ rights 
In its treatment of cases related to indigenous peoples, the Court has clarified the scope 
and content of the special constitutional rights of these peoples. Through the use of 
anthropological consultants and ethnography, the Court has engaged indigenous peoples  
in a hermeneutic dialogue intended to make sense of the law in the many different 
cultures of the country. As shown by the reference to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights it is not unique in so doing in an international perspective. The large 
number of diverse ethnic groups in Colombia, however, has presented the Court with an 
especially difficult challenge: to avoid treating all indigenous peoples generically, as 
one homogeneous culture opposed to the majority Western civilization. Although not 
always successful, the thousands of pages of anthropological assessments that the Court 
has requisitioned from independent experts, much of which has found its way into the 
jurisprudence, speaks of the seriousness of the Court’s efforts. Identifying how 
fundamental constitutional rights are connected to the question of lands and the 
environment is particularly important in the context of growing economic interest in 
natural resource exploitation on the territories of indigenous peoples. 
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4 Constitutional justice and social change: Effectiveness of the 
Constitutional Court in protecting indigenous peoples’ rights  
4.1 The gap between recognition and implementation 
Drawing on the findings of the previous chapters, this chapter will analyze the 
effectiveness of the Constitutional Court’s treatment of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Faced with the wide gap between the legal recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and 
their implementation in practice, it is pertinent to question whether the Constitutional 
Court has contributed to improving the situation of indigenous peoples in Colombia, or 
whether its findings have had little relevance in practice.  
4.1.1   The destruction of the Embera-Katíos 
To highlight the contrast between the Court’s often favourable rulings and the 
continuing situation of serious and wide-spread human rights violations against 
indigenous peoples, the example of the Embera-Katío people of Alto Sinú is a sad but 
important example. The beginning of the predicament of the Embera-Katíos has already 
been described in this thesis.192 The Constitutional Court in Sentence T-652/98 was 
very clear that there had been a violation of the indigenous communities’ right to 
participation and that there existed an immediate threat to the cultural, social and 
economic integrity of the Embera-Katíos, indeed the survival of the entire people was at 
stake.193 The relevant authorities and the private company responsible for flooding the 
lands of the Embera-Katíos were ordered to financially recompense the communities for 
the damage done to them. In addition they were to, with the participation of the 
indigenous communities; elaborate an “ethno-development plan” which would help the 
people develop new ways of sustaining themselves as their traditional economic 
practices were no longer viable. Two years later the Constitutional Court reviewed a 
new tutela concerning the same communities, who protested that the local courts that 
 
192  A hydro-electric dam was constructed on their lands without a proper consultation process being 
carried out. The flooding of their lands made it impossible to continue their traditional economic 
practices, and thus threatened their subsistence.  See chapter 3.2, pp. 23-24; and chapter 3.4.2.3 p. 44, 
supra  
193  Sentence T-652/98, section “Decisión 1”. 
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were responsible for determining the size of the recompense refused to deal with their 
claim on procedural grounds.194 Again, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the 
indigenous communities, severely criticizing the lower lever courts for interpreting the 
case in such a restrictive manner that it led to a violation of fundamental rights. All 
would seem to be well, as the Constitutional Court left no room for doubt as to the legal 
entitlements of the indigenous communities, and gave detailed orders to the responsible 
actors.  
However, the human rights of the Embera-Katíos continue to be systematically violated, 
as documented by United Nations Special Rapporteur Stavenhagen. After the ruling of 
the Constitutional Court in 1998, violence against the Embera-Katíos communities 
escalated. Many were forcibly displaced, property was destroyed and several leaders 
were murdered or forcibly disappeared, both by paramilitaries and guerrillas.195 In 2001 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary measures to 
the community and its leaders, and repeatedly asked the Colombian government to take 
urgent steps to protect the lives and physical integrity of members of the community.196 
Despite this attention, killings and forced disappearances have continued to decimate 
the Embera communities. The government has not taken the necessary measures to 
protect the Embera-Katío people, who’ve seen many of their most prominent leaders 
assassinated since 1998.197  
Instead of following the court’s orders to create an “ethno-development” plan which 
would benefit the entire community, the implicated company has paid a monetary 
recompense directly to the individuals that were forced to move because of the flooding 
of their land. According to reports published by indigenous organizations in Colombia, 
such an unprecedented flow of cash into a culture unused to a monetary economy has 
contributed to an escalation of alcoholism, prostitution and the abandonment of 
ancestral territories and cultural practices.198  
The legacy of the dam that was built on the lands of the Embera-Katíos without their 
consent is violence and persecution, social disorganization and cultural destruction. 
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Stavenhagen stated in 2003 that there was a very real risk that the Embera-Katíos would 
not survive as a distinct people, and called it “a clear case of ethnocide”.199  
This case hints at how powerful economic actors both influence state authorities and 
employ violence in pursuit of their interests. The unconstitutional authorization of the 
construction of the dam, the unwillingness of the lower level courts to grant a fitting 
recompense on the grounds of minor technicalities, and the campaign of grave and 
systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law may all be due 
to pressure from sectors seeing the presence of the Embera-Katíos as hindering 
economic development. This is not a unique case, in fact the indigenous organization 
ONIC maintains that economic megaprojects are the main cause of conflict between the 
government and indigenous peoples in Colombia.200   
4.2   Measuring the results of the Constitutional Court’s practice 
4.2.1 The constitutionalization of daily life 
To evaluate the results of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court in the fifteen 
years they’ve been in existence, we must look at what changes they have contributed to 
bring about. High hopes were attached to the new Constitution, as its democratic and 
progressive character seemed destined to transform the relations between the country’s 
social forces and create a more legitimate political and social order. However, if the 
Constitution and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court were to be interpreted 
from an analytical perspective that sees the relation between law and social change in 
instrumental terms, the current political, economic and social conditions in Colombia 
would be a testimony of their resounding failure.201 With regard to indigenous peoples, 
the very serious situation of human rights violations that they endure, and which has 
even gotten worse since the late nineties, would indicate that the Court has not 
succeeded in its efforts to ensure the protection of their rights.  
However, if we don’t demand a relation of direct causality between the law and social 
change, it is easier to appreciate the positive effect made by the Constitution and the 
Court.202 Restrepo argues that the Constitution and the constitutional jurisprudence 
should be evaluated from an analytical perspective in which law and social order are 
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interconnected, in the sense that the law is conceived of as organizing the world in 
categories and concepts that influence people’s conscience and awareness, and in turn 
determine and restrict human action.203 This renders a more nuanced and complex 
analysis, in which it is possible to identify important changes in the general human 
rights situation both of indigenous peoples and other oppressed groups, despite the 
disheartening statistics of poverty and violence.  
Restrepo calls the most important effect of the Court’s jurisprudence “the 
constitutionalization of daily life”.204 This means that the language and opinions of the 
Constitutional Court have entered into the sphere of daily life of ordinary citizens, and 
raised their consciousness of what constitutional rights mean to people in practice. The 
judicial mechanisms for protecting rights have made constitutional justice the most 
visible means of justice to the common citizen, and progressive decisions by the Court 
have made it an important protagonist among the country’s institutions.205 A 
generalized lack of faith in the intentions and effectiveness of other State institutions 
only serve to reinforce this tendency. When the Court in its rulings identifies a situation 
of social oppression and devises a remedy for it, it establishes a “constitutional 
dialogue” with citizens that recognize their own situation in the Court’s decision and 
become increasingly aware of their rights.206 The perception that constitutional justice 
addresses real and recognizable injustices inspires a belief in many that their situation is 
possible to remedy. This in turn may lead people to finding ways of organizing 
themselves to try and improve their situation through collective action, and Restrepo 
concludes that in this way the discourse of the Constitutional Court has contributed to 
strengthening the social movements of Colombia.207  
4.2.2 Progress in the situation of indigenous peoples 
The Colombian indigenous movement is one of the few cases of continuous social 
organization in the country during the last 40 years. Prior to the Constitution of 1991 
their struggle focussed on recovering their lands, physically and legally. The 
Constitution’s ample provisions on the multicultural character of the Colombian nation, 
and the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the content of the right to cultural, social 
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and economic integrity paved the way for another kind of claims from indigenous 
peoples.208 Indigenous individuals and communities have actively used the tutela 
mechanism to claim full recognition of their right to remain culturally different from the 
majority society, while at the same time demanding to be recognized as full citizens.209 
The fact that the Court early on set the standard for its progressive line of interpretation 
was an encouragement to indigenous organizations. The belief that organized action 
through the legal system could bring fair results has promoted non-violent mobilization 
by indigenous communities, and thus reduced the likelihood of them abandoning their 
neutrality in the armed conflict.  
The claims of cultural diversity have taken many forms, some of which have been 
discussed in this thesis. The recognition of indigenous communities as collective 
subjects of fundamental rights is a good example,210 as the Court accepted that the 
primacy of the individual, prevalent in Western legal tradition, was inadequate to 
protect the well-being of indigenous peoples. The introduction of this element into the 
Court’s jurisprudence was a clear sign that the celebrated notion of a pluralist state 
could become reality after all, encouraging increased participation of indigenous 
peoples.  
The invitation to anthropologists to participate as expert witnesses and consultants in 
the Court’s proceedings has increased the magistrates’ knowledge of indigenous 
cultures, and the way the Court disseminates that knowledge through its case law is 
likely to have an educational effect also on other state institutions and society in 
general.  
In the case of recognition of land rights, which had begun some ten years prior to the 
Constitution, the rulings of the Constitutional Court have speeded up the formalization 
of indigenous peoples’ collective land titles and thus contributed to improving the 
situation of legal defencelessness in which many communities were living. The very 
important issue of natural resources and protection of cultural, social and economic 
integrity of indigenous peoples has brought groundbreaking decisions by the Court, 
invoking fundamental rights as the right to life and the freedom from forced 
disappearance. On a practical level, the Court has contributed to establishing formal 
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safeguards for these fundamental rights, creating clearly defined legal standards for 
projects affecting indigenous territories.  
4.2.3 Obstacles to implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights 
 Despite these important gains, favourable Court rulings are no guarantee of an 
improving human rights situation, as shown by the case of the Embera-Katíos of Alto 
Sinú. There is a lack of coherence between what the law and the constitutional 
jurisprudence says, and how this is implemented throughout the country. Several factors 
can be identified that help explain this situation: the slowness of attitudinal change; the 
internal armed conflict and the illicit drug economy; and the precariousness and 
corruption of the Colombian state. 
4.2.3.1 Racism 
Indigenous peoples in Colombia have for a long time been considered and treated as 
secondary citizens, stemming from a deeply ingrained racist belief that they are 
“savages” lagging behind on the path to development. Even today there is a widely held 
perception that indigenous peoples, in protesting against development projects affecting 
their lands, are selfishly hindering sorely needed economic development of the State. 
The relationship between the State and the indigenous communities has often been one 
of confrontation, as the communities have resisted the State’s polices of assimilating 
them into the cultural, economic, political, social and religious model of majority 
society.211 Despite the constitutional changes, the old attitude to indigenous peoples still 
persists in many State agencies and the population at large, influencing administrative 
practices and even court decisions.212 Such perceptions take a long time to change, 
which partially explains the gap between legislation and implementation. The efforts of 
the Constitutional Court are very important in this respect; as its commitment to cultural 
diversity and the language and ideas that characterize its opinions will hopefully, in the 
sense of Restrepo’s “constitutionalization of daily life”, gradually influence the attitudes 
of the population, paving the way for a conciliation of interests between indigenous and 
non-indigenous people.213  
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4.2.3.2 The internal armed conflict and the drug industry 
As was explained in chapter 1, the armed conflict in Colombia affects indigenous 
peoples disproportionately, mainly because of the strategic and economic importance of 
their territories. The efforts of insurgents, state forces and paramilitary groups to make 
indigenous communities submit to their control have had catastrophic consequences, 
leading some groups to the brink of extinction. The appropriation of indigenous lands 
for growing illicit crops and the government strategy for eradicating those same crops 
combine to forcibly displace indigenous communities and destroy their livelihood. 
These factors are, however, obviously far outside the Constitutional Court’s field of 
competence and their existence cannot be taken as a sign of the Court’s failure. The 
Court has no enforcement capacity of its own; it is the security forces under the 
command of the executive branch of government that are responsible for guaranteeing 
the security of the citizens, including the suppression of illegal, armed groups. What the 
Court is doing in this situation is to review the constitutionality of the practices that the 
executive power employs in its counter-insurgent struggle and the “war on drugs”, 
insisting on the non-derogable character of fundamental rights, whatever the 
circumstances.  
4.2.3.3 Political corruption and institutional weakness 
The solid hold of a land-owning oligarchy on the political and economic life of 
Colombia has effectively dominated the state since its inception.214 This perceived lack 
of legitimacy combined with the weak nature of its institutions means that the State has 
been and continues to be unable and/or unwilling to provide adequate protection of the 
rights of a majority of the population.215 This is especially true in the case of indigenous 
peoples, whose economic, social and political marginalization have made them 
vulnerable to attempts to seize their lands for economic exploitation, be it through 
violence or legal reform. The Constitutional Court has consistently opposed the abuse of 
power of the political-economic elite, through expanding the population’s 
understanding of constitutional rights and establishing safeguards needed to uphold the 
democratic ideals of the Constitution. Even in this situation of conflict between the state 
powers, the Court cannot go beyond its role as interpreter of the Constitution; the 
enforcement of its decisions is left to the executive and legislative powers. Their lack of 
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political will and capacity, both being symptoms of widespread corruption, to 
implement constitutional rights when that would mean contradicting the interests of the 
oligarchy, helps to explain why indigenous peoples still have to fight for their lands and 
resources fifteen years after the new Constitution was created. 
4.3 Concluding remarks   
This evaluation of the results of the Constitutional Court’s efforts to protect indigenous 
peoples’ rights brings up two different but interrelated issues: the monitoring of the 
State’s fulfilment of the Constitution, and the so-called “constitutionalization of daily 
life”.  
The first is an ordinary control function of courts; overseeing that the Constitution’s bill 
of rights is upheld and ordering remedial action when it isn’t. In the case of indigenous 
peoples, the Court through its constitutional reviews has tried to ensure their on-going 
self-determination, recalling Anaya’s expression.216 In so doing it has made important 
contributions to the interpretation of indigenous peoples’ rights, drawing on the one 
hand on international human rights instruments as well as national law, and on the other 
on anthropological accounts of the diverse cultures of Colombia.  
On a theoretical level this labour has been very successful, in that Colombia’s legal 
provisions for protection and advancement of indigenous peoples is quite progressive by 
international standards. On a more practical level, the problem of insufficient 
implementation continues to mar Colombia’s human rights record, and the situation for 
many indigenous peoples is critical, even approaching ethnocide.  
The discrepancies between legislation and implementation are partially explained by the 
identification of social and political factors particular to the Colombian context. Taking 
these into account, indications are that the Constitutional Court is doing what it can 
within its mandate to protect the integrity of the bill of rights set down in the 
Constitution of 1991, and that the country’s serious short-comings in implementation 
would have been much worse without the Court’s efforts.  
The second issue; the “constitutionalization” of society, is a constructive practice which 
may help raise people’s consciousness about the scope and content of their 
constitutional rights, thus strengthening social organization and hopefully contributing 
to increased democratization in the long term. Concerning the right to cultural diversity, 
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this awareness-raising is equally important for indigenous and non-indigenous 
Colombians. The Court plays a very important role in pointing out the legal and moral 
fallacies in considering indigenous peoples to be anything other than full citizens with 
equal dignity and rights. This will hopefully contribute to change racist conceptions that 
are hindering recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and preventing joint action with 
other marginalized groups.  
As regards the integration of indigenous peoples into Colombian society, respecting the 
constitutional principle of cultural diversity, the frequent use by indigenous peoples of 
the tutela mechanism indicates that there is a widely held faith in the Constitution of 
1991 and the Constitutional Court’s ability to ensure justice and fairness to all citizens, 
irrespective of ethnic and cultural background. 
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5 Conclusion 
Indigenous peoples’ rights compose an area of international law which is still 
developing, and this process is being driven forward both by international institutions 
and national legislative and legal practice. Comparative studies of different national 
systems and practices can be very useful, both for establishing the current state of 
international law concerning indigenous peoples and for promoting progressive ideas 
that are shown to work. In this thesis, I have given an account of the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in Colombia, focusing on the Constitution and the work of 
the Constitutional Court.  
The case law of the Constitutional Court provides progressive interpretations of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, largely because of two elements of the way the Court has 
chosen to exercise its mandate. Firstly, the Court is true to the constitutional principle of 
interpreting the Constitution in accordance with international human rights treaties 
ratified by Colombia, and as such has been able to take a comprehensive human rights 
approach in its cases.217 Secondly, the Court has attempted to make real and effective 
the Constitution’s consecration of cultural diversity as a fundamental principle of the 
nation. By entering into a hermeneutic dialogue with indigenous peoples, using 
anthropological consultants and ethnography as aides in the difficult task of cultural 
translation, the Court has shown that the Constitution is equally relevant to all ethnic 
and cultural groups coexisting within what the Court calls the multicultural Colombian 
Nation.218  
The Court’s practice provides an example of how the concept of human rights may be 
made compatible with systems of thought that don’t share the Western notion of 
individualized subjects of rights. As such it could become an important point of 
reference for the treatment of indigenous peoples in other countries and international 
organizations, as well as for a more general debate about the universality of human 
rights.  
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By analyzing the case law of the Constitutional Court related to lands and natural 
resources of indigenous peoples, I have identified the scope and content of the 
constitutional protection against human rights violations arising from what I referred to 
in the introduction as “the second conquest”: the exploitation of natural resources on 
indigenous peoples’ territories. Especially important in this respect is the Court’s 
opinion that the destruction of an indigenous community’s natural environment 
threatens the rights to life, cultural integrity and the freedom from forced disappearance, 
potentially amounting to ethnocide. To protect against such violations, indigenous 
peoples have a fundamental right to participation in all matters affecting them, exercised 
by way of prior consultation. Although the Court does not consider that the right to 
participation includes a right to prior consent, it has established very precise demands 
for consultation processes. 
The recognition of indigenous communities as holders of fundamental rights, including 
collective property of their lands and cultural, social and economic integrity, is 
fundamental to the self-determination of these peoples. Through the process of 
“constitutional dialogue”, indigenous peoples acquire greater knowledge and 
consciousness of their rights and the judicial means to protect them. This strengthens 
the organizational capacity of the indigenous movement, which is conducive to create 
effective resistance to the extremely difficult situation that indigenous peoples face in 
Colombia today. In a context of internal armed conflict and rapid implementation of 
neo-liberal policies, indigenous peoples must use all the tools at their disposal to protect 
themselves and their cultural heritage. The tutela mechanism has proven to be a hugely 
effective tool, at least in terms of achieving explicit recognition of how the 
constitutional rights of indigenous communities are to be interpreted in practice. 
In the sense of “constitutionalization” of society, such recognition provides the basis for 
a conciliation of interests between indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups, 
encouraging collective strategies for social and political mobilization with the aim of 
securing the fulfilment of constitutional rights. 
I have identified several contextual factors which contribute to explain the discrepancy 
between legislation and implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights in Colombia. 
Racism, corruption and the armed conflict all play a part in the catastrophic human 
rights situation of indigenous peoples. Underneath it all, the deeply entrenched hold of a 
minority elite on the political and economic powers of the country prevents the 
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construction of a fully functional State, capable of mediating social conflicts in a non-
violent manner.  
Despite this extremely difficult context for constructing a regime that adequately 
respects the rights of citizens, among them indigenous peoples, it is my contention that 
the Constitutional Court’s efforts have served to prevent the situation from deteriorating 
further. Despite the difficulty of predicting Colombia’s political development, it is 
likely that the solidity of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence will in the long run 
help indigenous peoples consolidate their legal status and rights. Hopefully, the rightful 
place of indigenous peoples as equals in a multicultural society will one day cease to be 
merely a theoretical concept and become reality.  
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